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This thesis is a historical study of United States paramilitary operations since World 
War n. It presents a typology of operational environments based on the level of political 
constraint imposed upon the National Command Authority. An inductive approach is used 
to study three cases: OSS operations during WWII; attempts by the United States to 
ovethrow the Castro regime; and efforts by the United States to destabilize the Sandinistas 
in Nicaragua. From these cases emerge a set of criteria that are useful in defining 
operational success across a spectrum of paramilitary environments. These criteria can be 
used to evaluate the possible use of future paramilitary operations, as well as provide 
benchmarks to judge which organizations, or combination of organizations, would be best 
suited to perform the paramilitary mission. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper is a response to a series of questions proposed by United States Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM) concerning the role that special operations forces (SOF) 
should play in the conduct of paramilitary operations. Specifically, now that the military has 
a dedicated and revitalized SOF in the form of USSOCOM, would the country be better 
served by turning some or all paramilitary responsibility over to SOF? If so, what is the 
proper division of labor between USSOCOM and the intelligence community? Before these 
questions can be answered, it seems appropriate to take a historical look at our involvement 
with paramilitary operations. When has the United States resorted to paramilitary action? 
In which environments has it been successful? When has it failed? From this historical 
study, it should be possible to glean basic truths concerning the nature of paramilitary 
operations. The focus of this paper will be to discover those paramilitary criteria that are 
applicable across the spectrum of operational environments. Once these criteria are 
understood, we will be in a better position to evaluate and judge which organizations, or 
combinations of organizations, would be better suited to perform the paramilitary mission. 
A.   METHODOLOGY 
This paper hypothesizes that there are three conflict environments. Each is 
characterized by different degrees of political constraint. Political constraint is defined as 
the limits placed on objectives, as well as the means used to obtain these objectives. The 
following typology depicts these three distinct types of conflict. (Table 1) 
Typology of Conflict 




Unlimited Objectives Low 
World War II Unlimited Means 
TypeB 
Unlimited Objectives Medium Overthrow of Cuban Government 
Support of Afghanistan Guerrillas Limited Means 
TypeC 
Limited Objectives High Destabilization of Sandinista Government 
Support of Tibetan Guerrillas Limited Means 
Table 1. Conflict Environments. 
Type A conflict corresponds with total war. Within this frame of reference, there is 
minimal domestic and international political restraint. Wars are fought for unlimited 
objectives using unlimited means. The objective of this type of warfare is typically the 
complete destruction of a particular regime. Political, economic, and military will has been 
mobilized to achieve this objective. The state is prepared to spend an unlimited amount of 
capital to achieve the desired goal. During Type A conflict, because of the lack of restraint, 
no weapon that contributes to victory is spared. Operations and tactics considered too harsh 
or politically risky for lesser types of conflict, are readily employed. World War II was the 
epitome of Type A conflict. The entire country was mobilized to achieve the total 
destruction of the Nazi's and the defeat of the Japanese. Strategic Air was used to bomb 
civilian targets such as Dresden, and to fire bomb Tokyo. Ultimately, the United States 
dropped two atomic bombs on Japan. The United States also resorted to the use of 
unconventional warfare. Prior to World War II, the United States did not possess the 
capability, nor the motivation, to conduct these types of operations. The United States has 
not engaged in a Type A conflict since World War II. Nuclear proliferation has imposed 
restraints that make the cost of Type A conflict unrealistic. This launched a new era in 
warfare for nuclear states that can be described as Type B conflict. 
During a Type B conflict, the objective of the intervenor may well be the destruction 
of a particular regime, however the means used to achieve this goal must be tempered against 
the possibility of escalation to Type A conflict. Political reality dictates that limits be placed 
on the means used to achieve an objective. Type B conflicts employ conventional weapons 
below the nuclear threshold. Typically, the intervenor lacks the political commitment of 
Type A conflict. Mobilization of economic and military assets will be harder because of the 
perceived threat reduction. During the Cold War, the United States was not prepared to 
challenge the Soviet regime directly because of the threat of nuclear escalation. It was 
committed to the destruction of peripheral regimes that embraced the Soviet Union's 
ideology. These so called "proxy" wars allowed the United States to engage in Type B 
warfare without running a serious risk of escalation to Type A conflict. 
World War II and the Cold War environments essentially define the modern 
American paramilitary experience. Each took place within different conflict environments 
that provided unique opportunities and constraints. Today, with a diminished Russia, there 
is a conflict environment emerging that can be portrayed as Type C conflict. Below the 
nuclear threshold, except for China, there is not a country that can seriously challenge the 
United States militarily. This presents a new political dilemma for the United States. 
Without a serious military threat, it will become increasingly difficult to justify the use of 
overwhelming force. Politicians will be further constrained in terms of the means that they 
will be able to employ to achieve their objectives. Decreased means will translate to a need 
for decreased objectives. 
Type C interprets conflict as limited in nature. The goal is not the complete 
destruction of a particular regime. Rather, the goal is to achieve objectives at a lower 
threshold of cost. This type of conflict does not demand as much in terms of political, 
economic, and military capital as the two preceding types. Objectives can theoretically be 
secured through the use of limited means with little chance of escalation to the previous 
forms of conflict. 
B.        APPROACH 
Our initial case analysis will be drawn from both Type A and Type B environments. 
Chapter II presents Type A cases that include operations conducted by the American Office 
of Strategic Services (OSS) in conjunction with their British counterparts of the Special 
Operations Executive (SOE) during World War II. Specifically, these cases will include the 
Jedburgh operations in Europe, and Detachment 101 operations in Burma. These cases were 
chosen for their diversity of location, apparent success, and because they were both modern 
examples that predated the Cold War. Type B conflict is illustrated in Chapter III by the 
United States' most infamous paramilitary operation; the support of Cuban exile forces in 
their attempt to overthrow Fidel Castro. From these case studies emerges a set of refined 
criteria that can be used to evaluate future Type C operations. In Chapter IV these criteria 
are tested against the paramilitary efforts to destablize the Sandinista regime. Chapter V 
draws conclusions about the criteria and makes recommendations for further study. 
II. WORLD WAR II 
World War II was unique period in American history. It created the environment that 
made it imperative for the United States to step up to its responsibilities as a world power. 
The United States had global interests that were being challenged and WWII provided the 
impetus to assert its power to resolve these challenges. The threats to our interests are still 
with us today, but the context is different. World War II was a time of unlimited means. 
There was minimal restraint on the actions that America could take on behalf of its interests.1 
A public consensus that the Allies must prevail, drove policy makers and military leaders to 
contemplate all options that might secure victory. 
It is important to look at the WWII cases in this context because it illustrates why 
WWII was really the first foray by the United States into the world of paramilitary operations 
since the Revolutionary War. Since that time there was no motivation to use paramilitary 
forces. For most military leaders, the use of saboteurs and guerrilla fighters was alien. Those 
that could contemplate their use, viewed them as generally unreliable, ill-disciplined, and not 
quite above board. This helps explain why the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and its 
operations were limited in scale when compared with the British program. Traditionally a 
naval power, the British have always resisted a large land component. Facing a potentially 
lethal threat from the continent for the second time in two decades, Britain had learned to 
rely on an extensive unconventional capability embodied in the Special Operations Executive 
(SOE). Despite the late start and limited size, the OSS's programs were a beginning. By 
examining the following cases in light of the total war context, conclusions about 
paramilitary operations in this environment can begin to be understood. From the lessons 
'Actions such as the bombing of Dresden, the fire bombing of Tokyo, and the 
dropping of two atomic bombs show the level of violence that the United States was 
willing to inflict to achieve its ends. 
learned, it is possible to establish criteria for the conduct of paramilitary operations in a total 
war scenario. 
A.       GENESIS 
France fell to the Germans in 1940, and it looked as if Hitler would threaten 
England next. American political leaders knew that something must be done to prevent 
the Nazi's from becoming the dominant power on the Continent but prior to Pearl Harbor, 
isolationism was the prevailing sentiment of the American public. Roosevelt was up for 
reelection in November of 1940, and was reluctant to jeopardize his political chances by 
pushing an interventionist policy too strongly. News from England continued to deteriorate. 
Joseph P. Kennedy, American ambassador to London, thought the British were finished. He 
broadcast his opinions openly in London, sent home defeatist cables, and suggested that 
America think about living with a Europe dominated by Hitler. (Lankford 1991, p. 7) In an 
effort to get a candid, and possibly alternative assessment, Secretary of the Navy Knox 
recommended that the President send "Wild Bill Donovan", a highly decorated World War 
I veteran, successful businessman, and former public official, to England to study the 
methods and effects of German activities in Europe. In addition, Roosevelt wanted Donovan 
to observe how the British were standing up at a time when their fortunes were at a low ebb 
and they stood alone against Germany. (Roosevelt 1976, p. 5) In July of 1940, Donovan 
spent three weeks in London and reported to FDR upon his return that Kennedy was wrong. 
Britain would hold out but that it could not win without American aid. (Lankford 1991, p. 
7) 
In December of 1940 Roosevelt again dispatched Donovan to Europe to assess the 
strategic implications of the German efforts in the Mediterranean area. During the next three 
months, Donovan visited Gibraltar, Malta, Egypt, Greece, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Turkey, 
Cyprus, Palestine, Iraq, Spain and Portugal. (Roosevelt 1976, p. 6) Donovan's debriefing 
to the President emphasized three major points: First the gravity of the shipping problem; 
the dangers and opportunities which the situation in Northwest Africa represented for the 
United States; and finally, the extraordinary importance of psychological and political 
elements in the war and the necessity of making the most of these elements in planning and 
executing any national policies. (Roosevelt 1976, p. 6) Donovan reported that the Germans 
were making the fullest use of psychological warfare, of subversion and sabotage, and of 
special intelligence. As the German unconventional war machine pressed on, neither 
America or Britain was fighting this new and important type of war on more that the smallest 
scale. Donovan urged upon the President the necessity for preparation in the field of 
irregular and unorthodox warfare. (Roosevelt, 1976, p. 7) 
Through his close observations of the British system, Donovan saw the possibilities 
of an American covert intelligence organization. He lobbied for creation of a central agency 
charged with collecting intelligence. Despite intense bureaucratic infighting between the 
intelligence organizations of the Army, Navy, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
Donovan is partially successful. On July 11,1941, Roosevelt created by executive order the 
office of the Coordinator of Information (COI). Before this organization could gain a foot 
hold, it was reorganized when America entered the war after the Japanese attack at Pearl 
Harbor. 
On June 13,1942, Roosevelt reincarnated the COI as the Office of Strategic Services 
with Donovan at the helm, directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The OSS grew to 
five major branches: Secret Intelligence (SI), Research and Analysis (R&A), 
Counterespionage (X-2), Special Operations (SO), and Morale Operations (MO). (Lankford 
1991, p. 11) During World War II the OSS functioned globally. There were major 
commands in the Mediterranean, northern Europe, Burma, and China. The SO branch was 
responsible for paramilitary operations. 
It was the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) that provided the model for 
America's early paramilitary activity. The British mission was to create and foster the spirit 
of resistance in Nazi occupied countries. Once a suitable climate of opinion had been set up, 
they established a nucleus of trained men who could assist as a 'fifth column' in the liberation 
of the country concerned.(Foot 1966, pp. 11-12)   In Europe, networks of resistance 
movements were already operating to oppose German occupation. Agents of the SOE and 
the OSS provided arms and advice to these small guerrilla units. (Prados 1986, p. 15) The 
following case studies are examples of the OSS's paramilitary efforts. 
B.       JEDBURGHS 
1. History 
In the spring of 1942 Major General Gubbins, then head of the SOE London Group, 
in a note to the Chief of the SOE Security Section wrote: 
A project is under consideration for the dropping behind of the enemy lines, 
in cooperation with an Allied invasion of the Continent, of small parties of 
officers and men to raise and arm the civilian population to carry out guerrilla 
activities against the enemy's lines of communications. These men are to be 
recruited and trained by SOE. It is requested that jumpers or some other 
appropriate code name be allotted to [these] personnel. (Mendelsohn 1989, 
P-i) 
The code name allocated was "Jedburghs."2 The Jedburgh program would become one of 
Americas first paramilitary operations of the modern era. Jedburghs was a combined 
operation of the fledgling American OSS, their British mentors of the Special Operations 
Executive (SOE), and French counterparts of the Bureau Central de Renseignments et Action 
(BCRA). The Jedburgh force was composed of approximately 350 officers and enlisted men 
of the combined services. This included operational as well as support personnel. The men 
were divided into 90 three man teams consisting of two officers and one enlisted radio 
operator. The original American OSS contingent included 53 officers and 40 enlisted men. 
(Bank 1986, p. 14) 
2The name "Jedburgh" was derived from the twelfth century border wars 
between the Scots and the British invaders in the Jedburgh area of Scotland where a 
local Scottish group conducted guerrilla warfare. 
2. Objectives 
The Jedburgh's mission was to infiltrate, primarily by parachute, into occupied 
France, Belgium, and Holland prior to D-day and to provide a strategic reserve for creating 
and controlling offensive action behind the enemy lines on and after D-day where existing 
communications, leadership, organization, or supplies were inadequate. 
Their principle function was to liaison with resistance groups. Jedburgh teams were 
sent only to areas where there were actual or potential resistance elements, well behind the 
German front lines (at least 40 miles). The Jedburghs were not meant to foment resistance, 
but rather to harness the potential and focus it in a manner that would serve Allied purposes. 
The idea was to create a capable indigenous guerrilla force that would lie concealed until it 
could launch a coordinated guerrilla attack against German forces in conjunction with the 
D-day invasion and subsequent operations by Allied conventional forces. Specific tasks 
envisioned by Allied commanders included: 
a. Attacks on railway tracks and installations: round houses, turntables, and 
signals. 
b. Attacks on enemy road vehicles. 
c. Misdirecting, delaying and dislocating Panzer Division movements. 
d. Destruction of telecommunications. 
e. Liquidation of enemy Commanders and Staff, through attacks on staff cars, 
small administrative detachments, and rear installations. 
f. Interference with enemy supplies. 
g. Sabotage of enemy aircraft.   Attacks on planes, supplies and pilots off duty 
h. Destruction of electric power nodes used for military purposes. 
i. Demolition of minor bridges, or premature demolition of major bridges already 
prepared by the enemy. 
j. Preservation of vital points for later use by Allied armies (i.e., preventing final 
enemy demolition of bridges, ports, etc.) 
They strove to achieve these ends by organizing French resistance groups for guerrilla 
activity. This included equipping resistance groups with weapons and supplies and 
providing instruction in the use of those arms and supplies. Jedburghs provided tactical and 
strategic command and control capability by supplying radios and communications with 
Allied Headquarters. They also furnished technical advice and assisted in operations against 
the enemy. When needed, they actually led resistance groups in guerrilla actions. 
3. Team Hugh 
The following account of Jedburgh team Hugh was derived from their after action 
reports and radio logs as described in the War Diary of the London Special Operations 
Branch of the OSS. (Mendelsohn 1989, pp. 17-25,64-106) 
a. Mission 
The first of ninety-three Jedburgh teams to be infiltrated behind German lines 
was team Hugh. Team Hugh was dispatched from London on the night of 5 June, 1944 to 
the Chateauroux area in the Department of Indre, France. Its immediate mission was to 
contact resistance groups and assist advanced SAS elements establish a base from which 
raids could be carried out against enemy lines of communications (LOC). At the same time 
they were expected to commence immediate attacks against the Toulouse railway to prevent 
German reinforcements from leaving Chateauroux. Next, they were to evaluate the state of 
resistance elements in the area in terms of personnel, leadership, arms, and then report back 
to Special Forces Headquarters (SFHQ).3 Upon confirmation from SFHQ, they would 
organize, train, and equip resistance groups to conduct unconventional warfare against the 
German occupation forces. 
The team along with two SAS officers, was most likely infiltrated by an RAF 
Stirling bomber. The bomber would be sent along with a scheduled strike package and then 
after crossing into France, it would feign a malfunction and turn back toward England. 
3SFHQ was a combined organization (British/American) to conduct 
unconventional warfare. 
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Gentians were conditioned to seeing stray bombers limping home and usually no suspicions 
were raised. Once on a westerly heading, the team would be parachuted to a waiting 
reception committee made up of agents and partisans. 
Team Hugh was met by a French intelligence agent and a reception committee 
of five indigenous personnel. The next day, Hugh met with chief of the "Armee Secrete" 
(AS) of Indre - code named Surcouf, as well as a British agent named Samuel who was 
running a local intelligence network. It was determined that Indre was not the most efficient 
area for the SAS to concentrate their efforts. At the time there was little German activity and 
it was felt there would be more targets in the region of Poitiers. It was decided that the main 
body of the SAS contingent should be dropped near Aigurande. Team Hugh arranged and 
supervised reception committees for the SAS during the nights of 8 and 9 June. Then they 
turned the SAS over to a resistance group near Lussac-les Chateaux, where they would be 
in contact with Samuel, and in a safe position to launch operations against German targets 
travelling between Bordeaux and Poitiers. Having completed their first mission, they turned 
to the much larger task of organizing and arming the resistance in the Indre area. 
The effects of Operation OVERLORD and the opening of a second front 
made it almost impossible to stop the influx of new recruits ready to take the fight to the 
Germans. Radio traffic from Team Hugh on 8 June, two days after D-day, clearly indicates 
that the French were rallying to the cause. 
Impossible to limit the numbers joining the resistance owing to spontaneous 
uprising. Urgently require Jedburgh teams, arms and materials. 
By mid-June the strength of the resistance in the department of Indre had increased to about 
3,000 men of whom roughly half were armed. Unfortunately many of these men were 
untrained, lacked leaders, and were not sure of themselves. Depending on their political 
persuasion, these men flocked to one of the many resistance groups that had formed to 
liberate France. The Jedburghs acted as a controlling general staff. They worked with rival 
11 
organizations such as: the Organization de la Resistance dans 1 'Armee (ORA), composed 
mainly of members of the Giraudist groups and the old Armee d' Armistice; Forces 
Francaises de Interieur (FFI), which was the Gaullist Resistance known as French Forces of 
the Interior; and the Francs-tireurs et partisans (FTP), which was the military wing of the 
French Communist Party; to consolidate command and control, and form a united guerrilla 
front against the Germans. 
Two day conference at our H.Q. with DMR representative has been 
successful. Plan of action decided. Training center for cadres agreed. Pupils 
from F.F.I., F.T.P. arriving tomorrow. All keen on Jedburgh teams. F.T.P. 
rather sticky."4 
The rather sticky attitude of the FTP might be explained by the fact that 
Communists had objectives that conflicted with the Western ambitions for post-war France. 
The FTP was a reluctant ally. Foot points out that prior to the German invasion of Russia, 
a small core of disciplined Stalinists who ran the French Communist Party, had welcomed 
the German occupation forces as allies of the Soviet Union. They had called for a National 
Front to embrace all French Parties and assert a neutral position between Germany and 
England. Once Germany attacked eastward, the communist turned the organization into an 
anti-German Force. (Foot 1966, pp. 159-160) This organization had control over parts of the 
French proletariat with the discipline and clandestine experience to make life hard for the 
Germans in the main industrial areas of Paris, Lyons, and the northeast through the FTP. 
From 1941 to 1944 the FTP had steadily gained stature in areas of the countryside where the 
traditions of 1789 still favored voting for the extreme left. The Indre area was one of heavy 
communist sympathy. Nevertheless, the communists lacked arms and ammunition and were 
thus forced to acquiesce to certain demands of SOE agents and Team Hugh in order to 
acquire these materials. 
"Team Hugh radio message to SFHQ, 26 June 1944. 
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As a result of these concessions, the resistance in the Indre area of operations 
was organized into three categories. First, all troops would be incorporated into the Maquis 
under the command of Surcouf (FFI). The Maquis would be formed into companies and 
battalions. Colonel Martel (ORA) would command the mobile troops, while the static 
elements would continue to be led by the "Chefs de Secteur." A third category of resistance 
envisioned individuals who would carry out their normal work, but would have personal 
arms hidden near their homes. These men could be called upon when necessary. 
Having established a command and control structure, it became possible to 
begin organizing, instructing, and advising the different groups. By the middle of July, with 
the help of extensive parachute operations, the resistance in Indre had five mobile battalions 
in addition to well organized Maquis in every sector. Up until this time there had been no 
large scale confrontation with the Germans despite an extensive sabotage campaign. There 
were five hundred railway cuts from 6 June through 6 July in Indre alone. 
The situation changed on 8 July when the Maquis in the Vienne were attacked 
by a German repression column of about 2000 SS. This attack was staged in conjunction 
with a raid on SAS group "Bullbasket." Apparently the SAS group had been neglecting their 
security obligations by parading around the country in Jeeps. This alerted the Germans to 
the Allied presence. The attack killed more than 20 and sent the Maquis on the run. As the 
Maquis retreated, their security precautions were also marginal and as a result, they led the 
Germans to Team Hugh. Fortunately, there was enough warning for Hugh and the resistance 
to disperse and avoid a catastrophe. 
After this near miss, Team Hugh decided to slow down the guerrilla activity 
and concentrate on security while at the same time expanding the guerrilla force. 
Throughout the remainder of July, Team Hugh inculcated a spirit of discipline and instituted 
training programs, while at the same time arming over 6,000 partisans. In the safer areas 
they turned the Maquis into infantry training depots who served as reinforcements for the 
mobile battalions. This increased consolidation began to pay off. During the last days of 
13 
July, Team Hugh noted the first concentrations of enemy troops to the south and west of the 
Indre department. This gave them an indication of a probable general withdrawal. As 
German circulation in the north and northeast of the department became more intensified, 
the order was given for restrained guerrilla activity. Most of the action dealt with cars from 
Brittany and Nantes containing German personnel who had bad route itineraries, and had not 
made provision against Maquis attack. In the early stages of withdrawal, the Germans feared 
air attack more than they did the Maquis. As a result, they often withdrew in small 
inconsequential numbers. Guerrilla activity forced the Germans to travel in convoys. This 
allowed Hugh and other Jedburgh teams to call in air strikes against them. By the end of 
July, the Germans showed a healthy respect for the resistance in Indre. They continually 
tried to skirt the area enroute to Bordeaux, La Rochelle and Nantes. 
By mid August, the strength of armed and organized resistance groups in the 
Indre-et-Loire area under the direct control of Team Hugh had increased to between eight 
and ten thousand. The number of guerrillas was reaching the maximum that could operate 
as Maquis in the surrounding area without coming out into the open. Unfortunately there 
was very little air support in August of 1944 because of higher priority missions. 
At this same time, Team Hugh received intelligence that a SS party of 200 
men was coming from Poitiers with the intention of blowing up the dam at Eguzon. This 
was the most important source of hydroelectric power in France. Once destroyed, it would 
take a long time to replace. Team Hugh surrounded the dam with a thousand FTP and 
requested assistance from London. They could not take control of the dam and electric 
facility because it was occupied by 300 Wehrmacht. In response to the Jedburgh request, 
London sent an Operations Group (OG) of thirty American airborne troops. Obviously the 
thirty paratroopers were not going to make a difference. Team Hugh decided to parade them 
around the country to create the illusion that there was at least a brigade of Allied 
paratroopers. The psyop had the required effect. The Wehrmacht garrison, who were 
heavily armed, withdrew without a fight. 
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Numerous small scale guerrilla attacks continued throughout August and 
September. By mid-August it was clear that the Germans were in full retreat. On 21 August 
the German garrison evacuated Chateauroux towards the east and were attacked by the 
Maquis who were lying in ambush. Team Hugh reported over 200 enemy killed and 100 
captured vehicles compared with very slight losses. 
The mass retreat from the southwest and west forced the Germans to use 
every line of retreat that they could. Team Hugh mobilized the resistance to restrict the 
number of escape options used by the Germans. This was done by attacking all the known 
escape routes and forcing the enemy to concentrate in larger convoys along fewer routes. 
These fewer routes were more vulnerable to Allied air attack, and could be attacked by 
guerrilla mobile troops. 
Originally, German columns were moving along an axis from Loches to 
Nouans enroute to the Cher valley. These columns were caught in ambush and punished by 
the resistance until the end of August. Dismayed at their losses, the enemy changed their 
main axis to Saint Flovier to Chatillon. This had the same result and the Germans were 
forced to try Pleumartin to Preuilly, and finally Tournon to Mezieres. The resistance was 
having the desired effect. On the night of 29 August a total of 123 men comprised of a 
Jedburgh team, 2 OG's and sixty Maquis held up a column of 10,000 Germans for over six 
hours, inflicting severe losses and losing only two. 
By early September, the enemy abandoned their northern itineraries for the 
single axis of escape defined by Preuilly-Mezieres-Vendoeuvres-Chateauroux. Team Hugh 
coordinated resistance attacks on the fleeing columns and called in very successful air attacks 
on these columns. The Germans and the Resistance were overrun by the American 83rd 
Division on 9 September as a final lame German column of 20,000 men passed by 
Chateaurox. Team Hugh's mission was complete and they turned themselves in to the Allies 
and were passed back to SFHQ. 
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C.        SERVICE DETACHMENT UNIT 101 
1. History 
When Japan first invaded China in 1937, they took control of all China's ports and 
major cities except for those in the deep interior. This meant that all supplies to China had 
to go by way of the "Burma Road." Supplies that traveled the Burma Road arrived by sea 
at the port of Rangoon. They are then shipped via rail or barge along the Irrawaddy River 
to Mandalay, then by rail over the mountains to Lashio. From there, they traveled by truck 
along cart paths and trails to Kunming, China. This is one of the oldest known trade routes. 
Marco Polo followed this path on his return from Cathay. 
In 1942 the Japanese invaded Burma. They took control of Rangoon and struck north 
to Mandalay. One Japanese column then turned west and occupied Akyab, while another 
column occupied Kalewa in central Burma. A third column struck north and east to Lashio. 
This third column then split into two. Half pushed toward China along the Burma road until 
it reached a suitable defensive position; the other made its way north to Myitkyina. Using 
Myitkyina as their base, the Japanese established a perimeter of troops along the Indian 
border and then east, between China to the north and Burma, Thailand, and Indochina to the 
south. Essentially all ground lines of Allied supply to China were cut off. The Allies were 
forced to use airlift to fly the "Hump" across the Himalayas from Ledo in India to Kunming. 
Despite the valiant efforts of Chennault's 14th Air Force Flying Tigers, General Stilwell felt 
the key to victory in the China- Burma-India (CBI) theater was to reestablish a land link with 
China. His plan called for three Chinese divisions (the 22nd, 30th, and 38th) to drive the 
Japanese 18th division east across northern Burma. As they did this, engineers would build 
an all-weather road to hook up with the old Burma road at Lashio, south of Myitkyina. From 
Lashio, supplies would flow into China via the traditional route. Essential to this plan was 
the capture of the town of Myitkyina and the adjacent airport. 
Originally conceived by Donovan as an intelligence organization, Detachment 101 
ran into problems in the Pacific theater. Stilwell was a passionate admirer of the infantry 
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soldier. He was just as fervently prejudiced against the "irregular" military activity proposed 
by the OSS. Donovan teamed up with Chennault, who needed an intelligence organization 
deep in enemy territory to provide targets for his bombing campaign, to pressure Stilwell to 
relent. Rounds of bureaucratic infighting ensued, and reluctantly Stilwell allowed 
Detachment 101 to form along the lines of a paramilitary force similar in function to the 
Jedburghs. On giving the order authorizing Detachment 101, General Stilwell is quoted as 
saying that he didn't want to hear anything more about the unit until he began hearing booms 
from behind the Japanese lines. In retribution for bureaucratic loss to Donovan and 
Chennault, Stilwell sent the unit to India where they had little chance for action. This 
situation did not last for long because Stilwell was forced to press 101 into action to 
accomplish his plan to open the Ledo road. 
2. Mission 
Detachment 101's mission was to infiltrate behind Japanese lines, establish an 
intelligence network to scout the Myitkyina area, organize a resistance movement, and then 
conduct unconventional warfare against the enemy. Eventually their mission included 
leading indigenous columns in direct action against the Japanese. 
The OSS set up a training camp in India at a British owned tea plantation in the town 
of Nazira. There 11 officers and 9 enlisted men of the OSS trained and prepared for their first 
attempts at establishing a network of agents and guerrillas. This first try involved flying an 
eight-man team into Fort Hertz in Burma. Fort Hertz was a lone British outpost with an 
airfield in northern Burma. The Japanese had not bothered to attack it since their attention 
was focused west toward India. From Fort Hertz, the Detachment 101 team patrolled the 
jungle probing for soft spots in the Japanese lines. The Japanese provided no opening so the 
group decided to return to Fort Hertz and try to infiltrate by air. The group parachuted deep 
into Burma about 250 miles south of Fort Hertz and 100 miles south of Myitkyina. Their 
intention was to scout the area and blow up bridges and other parts of the rail line from 
Myitkyina south. They were partially successful before the Japanese discovered them and 
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sent them ranning. What made the escape possible for some of the men was the fact that 
they put themselves in the care of Kachin villagers. The Kachins guided them along little 
known trails and eventually got the team back to Fort Hertz. It took the group three months 
and they covered over a thousand miles. 
The Kachin tribesmen are decedents of Mongolians from the Himalayas in the border 
area between Tibet and China. For centuries they have lived in the mountainous area of 
Northern Burma. As a people, the Kachins had no love for the Burmese, Japanese, or British 
for that matter. The Kachins are a primitive people and as such they were responsive to the 
appeals of Christian missionaries. It just so happened that two Irish-Catholic missionaries 
escaped from Myitkynia shortly after the Japanese attacked and had made their way to Fort 
Hertz where they joined Detachment 101. These two, along with a surgeon who had 
previously practiced in Burma and was now part of the eclectic Detachment, were invaluable 
in enlisting the Kachin natives from the surrounding mountain tribes and allowing 
Detachment 101 to recultivate the North Kachin Levy (NKL) guerrilla movement that had 
previously been supported by the British. 
A Kachin would be trained as a radio operator and then parachuted into an area 
where he was familiar with the local people. After he prepared the village, he would radio 
back and an American lieutenant would be dropped in. The two of them would recruit, 
equip, and train a band of Kachin guerrillas with weapons and tactics. After training, the 
guerrilla group would be sent to scout out the enemy and his installations. This information 
would be passed back and in many cases was used as reconnaissance for air strikes by the 
14th Air Force. The intelligence network was also used to rescue downed airman. Word 
was passed to Kachin villages to look out for crews and pass them on to the nearest 101 
guerrilla group. Somewhere between 25 and 35 percent (a total of 425) of the downed crew 
members were rescued by Detachment 101. 
Early in the war, Detachment 101 units tried to avoid combat engagements with the 
enemy. Guerrilla groups would lay in ambushes on the trails leading to their camps as a 
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defense and concentrate on intelligence. As the war wore on, the Kachin Ranger trained and 
led by the OSS detachment, found themselves increasingly acting as pathfinders, scouts, and 
flank protection for more conventional units. On such unit was the 5307th Provisional 
Regiment, which became known as Merrill's Marauders. The unit code name was 
GALAHAD. 
The Marauders were a commando force modeled after the British "Chindits". They 
were designed to travel light and conduct fast-moving , slashing attacks. Stilwell planned 
to use the GALAHAD force in conjunction with the three American led Chinese divisions 
to accomplish his Burma campaign. Early in the campaign, a battalion of the Marauders was 
cut off from the main body and surrounded by the Japanese. The enemy had encircled the 
force and was attempting to close the noose. Daily the trapped Marauders were resupplied 
by 14 Air Force planes but it was just a matter of time before the Japanese would overrun 
them. It was near the end of the second week that a band of Kachin Rangers known as the 
"Lightning Force" attacked the Japanese from the rear. This band of Kachin natives led by 
an American Lieutenant Tilly, ambushed the Japanese again and again. When the Japanese 
tried to strike back, they found nothing. The Kachins would melt back into the jungle only 
to reappear with a more savage attack. These attacks by the Lightning Force allowed the 
battalion of Marauders to slip through the Japanese lines and escape back to the main 
column. 
After two major campaigns during GALAHAD's first four months in the jungle, they 
had been decimated by casualties, disease, and fatigue. Their ranks had been thinned by half. 
Ordinarily they should have been relieved but Stilwell had one last task for them. They 
would be combined with the three Chinese divisions sent to capture the town of Myitkyina. 
Det 101's Kachin rangers would act as scouts and make up the difference in GALAHAD's 
thinned ranks. The combined force of the Marauders, Chindits, 4000 Chinese, and several 
hundred Kachin Rangers set off across the 6000 ft Kuman mountains and three weeks later 
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emerged to surprise the Japanese at Myitkyina. They retook the town and airfield with little 
difficulty. 
Myitkyina would eventually fall back into Japanese hands but this should not obscure 
the contribution of Detachment 101. By the end of the war, there were more than 500 
Americans, with organized guerrilla bands of 8,500 native Kachins. In the war's last stages, 
which saw retreat of the Japanese 56th Division, the Kachin guerrillas preyed upon enemy 
columns, killing and wounding thousands. Had the Chinese force moving down from 
Yunnan lived up to tactical expectations, the joint effort could have annihilated the Japanese 
division. As it turned out the Chinese force was terribly slow to link up with the Kachins and 
the decisive battle never came to pass. Nevertheless the Kachin field force did help trap two 
powerful Japanese divisions during the Allies' final offensives in Burma. It was a major 
achievement for the OSS. Detachment 101 succeeded in mobilizing a paramilitary force 
nearly thirty times its size and then used that force to execute highly complex and successful 
military missions. 
D.       ANALYSIS 
If we consider the preceding case studies successful, then it is important to determine 
why they were successful. To do this, criteria for evaluation must be established. After 
examining the above cases, common characteristics begin to emerge. These criteria break 
out into three different levels of analysis; strategic, operational, and tactical. 
1. Strategic Criteria 
Strategic criteria define the political, military and economic environment for the 
intervenor. Are the conditions right for an intervening force to pursue a paramilitary option? 
For the two preceding cases, the environment was characterized by total war. This meant 
that there was little restraint on politicians or military leaders to pursue a paramilitary option. 
The war provided a strategic unity of purpose. Defeat of the Nazi's and the liberation of 
France, as well as the defeat of the Japanese military, provided over arching goals that could 
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be seen and understood by everyone involved in the respective efforts. The American public, 
as well as each soldier, knew and understood the strategic goal. 
The war also placed American society in an environment that restricted their usual 
freedoms. Information was withheld from the general public in the name of national 
security. Curtailment of information during total war was generally accepted by the public 
because they understood the importance of the strategic goals, and could rationalize the need 
for security versus the need for public information. Typically, paramilitary operations are 
designed to be covert and clandestine in nature. In both the WWII case studies, there were 
elaborate measures taken to ensure that the operations were kept secret from the public as 
well as the enemy. An open society has a natural aversion to operations that are shielded 
from public scrutiny. Despite this antagonism, during WWII the strategic goals outweighed 
any hesitancy that might have existed by politicians to employ covert strategies. 
This aversion of covert warfare also carries over into the military. A democracy's 
military is an extension that society's values. Accordingly, there was tremendous doubt in 
the minds of more traditional military leaders as to the need for paramilitary forces. 
Bureaucratic infighting and traditional turf battles can explain much of the resistance, but 
when contemplating the use of paramilitary capability, policy makers and military leaders 
alike, must take into account the basic contradictions that are posed for an open society. 
Again, it was fixation on the strategic goal that allowed leaders such as Generals Patton and 
Stilwell, not only to contemplate the use of irregular warfare, but to authorize its use. Both 
these men had little faith in guerrilla warfare, but being pressed to achieve the strategic 
objectives, they came to see that paramilitary operations could contribute to the attainment 
of those goals. 
2. Operational Criteria 
Operational criteria describe the organizational potential of the protege. They also 
define which paramilitary operations are possible given the limitations of the operational 
environment. There must be an environment that provides sufficient organizational space 
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to mobilize popular support. Within the framework of World War II there were ideal 
conditions to mobilize a paramilitary force. Aside from the fact that both Germany and 
Japan aggressively invaded and occupied their neighbors territory, atrocities committed by 
both regimes provided powerful incentive for the creation of resistance groups. The 
Germans and the Japanese also adopted a policy that treated resistance fighters and their 
supporters as criminals. This led to further increases in the mobilization potential. 
The governments of France and Burma generally conceded to the demands of the 
respective occupation forces. The French Vichy government actually helped German forces 
ferret out suspected guerrilla organizations. By abandoning the needs of the French people, 
the Vichy government gave the populace few operational alternatives. With no formal 
instrument to resist the demands of the German occupation forces, Frenchmen were left with 
one of two choices; accept the occupation or resist. For many the choice was to fight. 
Structural factors played into the situation in Burma. The Kachins, as described 
earlier, immigrated from the Tibetan region, and were an ethnic minority in Burma. This 
provided the Kachins with a natural mobilization potential. The invasion by the Japanese 
was seen as clear threat and served to ripen that potential. Life under the xenophobic 
Japanese was seen as intolerable. These fears were confirmed by the brutal Japanese 
treatment of those unfortunate enough to be captured by them. 
In both of the WWII case studies the local populace had the incentive to resist. They 
were permissive environments in terms of mobilization potential. Their enemy was our 
enemy. This is a very important point. It would be very difficult to mount a paramilitary 
campaign in an area that lacked natural mobilization potential. 
Closely related to the strategic unity of purpose idea is that of operational vision. 
Operational vision assumes that the minimum or maximum objectives of the participants can 
be achieved by pursuing a common operational strategy. In other words, do all the players 
basically agree that they will achieve their purpose by the proposed actions? The need for 
a common operational vision is especially important in paramilitary activities because of the 
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diverse nature of the actors involved. It must be remembered that not everyone has the same 
motivation. 
The case of the French resistance is an excellent example. Multiple and diverse 
French political factions such as the ORA, FFI, and FTP were involved in the resistance. 
Each had their own ideas for France's political future after the war. They were united by the 
fact that they could not achieve their individual objectives until the Germans were defeated 
and France liberated. The operational environment in the Pacific theater was similar. 
Chinese nationalist and communist were at odds with each other over the eventual political 
landscape. Chinese communist were already mobilizing their guerrilla potential. With the 
Japanese invasion of 1937, a stronger threat was introduced and the rival factions temporarily 
set aside their differences in order to pursue a common strategic objective through the use 
of a parallel operational vision. Both the Chinese nationalist and communist believed that 
the ejection of the Japanese occupation forces was necessary before they could achieve their 
ultimate political destiny. 
In the case of World War II, the operational vision was quite simple for the Allies. 
This vision manifest itself in strategic air and ground campaigns designed to kill as many 
Germans and Japanese as possible. Allied armies and OSS organized resistance fighters 
were united in this operational vision. What made the Jedburgh and Detachment 101 
programs so successful was that they did not have to create the operational vision, all they 
had to do was facilitate it at the unconventional level. 
The total war scenario also dictated that paramilitary operations would be designed 
to achieve limited objectives. The nature of total war demands that it be fought for ultimate 
objectives. By definition, ends of this magnitude will be defended with the full weight of 
an adversaries capabilities. Paramilitary forces are not designed or equipped to be the main 
coercive force in this scenario. At no time did the Allies or the guerrillas, believe that 
paramilitary operations would achieve strategic goals by themselves.   In both WWII 
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operations, the goal of the OSS was to mobilize a force multiplier to aid ongoing, or follow 
on, conventional operations. 
3. Tactical Criteria 
These criteria characterize the physical capability of the paramilitary force to mount 
and sustain effective operations. The nature of paramilitary operations dictates that force 
must have an efficient logistical system. Infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply are the life 
lines of paramilitary forces. Depending on the scope of the operation, it may be possible to 
live off the land, however during WWII this was impossible. Although the actual OSS teams 
were small, the numbers of guerrillas organized by the Jedburghs and Detachment 101 
necessitated the need for a massive logistics effort to support them. Because resistance or 
insurgent groups must operate in a clandestine manner, they are limited logistically. The 
large amounts of weapons and supplies necessary to sustain the force cannot have a visible 
or static infrastructure. This means that a paramilitary force must have a mobile and 
obscured system for resupply. The Jedburghs had special components of the British and 
American Air Forces at their disposal for the purposes of infiltration and resupply. The 
Kachin rangers were resupplied almost exclusively by the Chennault's 14th Air Force. 
Clandestine and covert logistics can be a complicated process. It takes specially trained 
flight crews and very often modified aircraft or naval vessels. Fortunately, these were 
available during World War II 
A second tactical criteria delineates a need for the ability to function in a security 
environment. Because the paramilitary force is the weaker force, it must remain hidden from 
the adversary until it reaches a point where it has the tactical advantage. The dilemma that 
develops from this need for security poses a problem for all paramilitary organizations. As 
the organization grows in numbers and strength, it becomes more visible, and more 
vulnerable to attack. Team Hugh was aware of this as the Maquis' numbers swelled in 
August of 1944, and word had not come yet from London to unleash the Resistance forces. 
It is also important to note that not just the intervenor must maintain security, but all of the 
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peripheral organizations that it deals with must be able to function equally well in the 
security environment. This includes support agencies as well as protege forces. Once any 
part of an organization that depends on obscurity becomes visible, conventional forces will 
apply their superior strength and destroy it. We saw this when Team Hugh was 
compromised by poor security precautions on the part of SAS force "Bullbasket" and the 
subsequent mistakes by the Maquis. 
E.        SUMMARY 
In this chapter, two cases were examined that are representative of America's 
paramilitary experience within the context of total war. These cases provided three levels 
of analysis to look at the nature of paramilitary operations. These include the strategic, 
operational, and tactical levels. At each level, criteria were evident that can be used to 
measure the effectiveness of a paramilitary program at that particular level of analysis. These 
criteria for paramilitary operations in the total war context are as follows: 
Strategic: 
(1) Presence of a clear and identifiable strategic goal that serves to focus effort and 
provides a unity of purpose for the participating parties involved. 
Operational: 
(2) Existence of a permissive environment in which there is organizational space to 
mobilize popular support. 
(3) A common or parallel operational vision that allows all participant to achieve 
their minimum or maximum objectives. 
(4) Operations are designed to achieve limited ends. 
Tactical: 
(5) Sufficient logistical support exists to support the planned paramilitary operations. 
(6) The intervening paramilitary force, as well as the protege force is able to function 
in a security environment. 
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The following chapter will study paramilitary operations conducted against Cuba 
during the Cold War. It will make an effort to determine if the above criteria still apply in 
an environment characterized by the attainment of unlimited objectives by the use of limited 
means. 
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III. COLD WAR 
On June 18, 1948, six days prior to the Soviets blockade of Berlin, the NSC 
promulgated NSC 10/2 which expanded the CIA's authority to conduct covert action. 
... As used in this directive, "covert operations" are understood to be all 
activities (except as noted herein) which are conducted or sponsored by this 
Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly 
foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US 
Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons 
and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any 
responsibility for them. Specifically, such operations shall include any covert 
activities related to: propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, 
including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; 
subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground 
resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, and support 
of anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world, [italics 
added] Such operations shall not include armed conflict by recognized 
military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for 
military operations... .5 
Eisenhower built upon this further when he signed NSC-5412/2.6 This provided the 
CIA with the broadest possible charter with regard to covert activity. NSC 10/2 and NSC 
5412/2 were the foundation upon which much of the CIA's paramilitary activity throughout 
the Cold War was based. 
A.       CUBA 
After more than thirty years, the paramilitary operation designed to overthrow 
Castro's regime still haunts the United States. The failure of OPERATION PLUTO 
represents the most visible failure of an American foreign policy that included paramilitary 
options. A thorough review of this case study's background and operational implications is 
essential to understand paramilitary operations in a Type B conflict environment. 
5NSC 10/2, 18 Jun 1948. 
6NSC 5412/2,28 Dec 1955. 
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1. History 
American intervention in Cuba began in February 1898, when the U.S.S. Maine was 
mysteriously blown up in Havana Harbor. The American public was shocked, and in a fit 
of nationalistic outburst insisted on an end to Spanish rule in Cuba. On 11 April the United 
States declared war on Spain. The Cuban War for Independence, which began in 1895, 
ended four months after the Americans formally entered the war. Following the war, the 
United States refused to annex Cuba as Spain had requested.7 Instead, the Treaty of Paris 
provided that the United States should act as a trustee of the island, assuming responsibility 
"for the protection of life and property," and that on the termination of American occupancy, 
the new government should assume the same obligations. In 1901 Congress passed the Platt 
Amendment which had a lasting effect on American and Cuban relations. Among other 
things, the Platt Amendment provided that Cuba, "consents that the United States may 
exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance 
of a government adequate for the protection of life, property and individual liberty. . . ." 
(Lazo 1968, p. 50-2) This amendment was originally added to the Cuban Constitution as an 
annex and then later its provisions were incorporated into a treaty between the two countries. 
In essence it was the price of American intervention. For years the Platt Amendment 
provided benefits for both countries. Guantanomo provided the United States with a 
strategic port to project power throughout the Caribbean in keeping with the Monroe 
Doctrine. For Cuba, the Amendment insured a flow of American capital that made economic 
development possible. The Platt Amendment was eventually repealed in 1934, but it had set 
a strong precedent for American involvement in Cuba. 
Fidel Castro came to power on Jan 1, 1959. Shortly after the takeover he made a 
conciliatory speech stressing that revolutionary reforms would be carried out "little by little", 
in an evolutionary spirit. The United States adopted a "wait and see" attitude. It was hoped 
7One of the first steps taken by the chief of the Spanish peace mission was to 
formally request that the United States annex Cuba. More Spaniards, and Spanish 
capital, resided there than in any other distant area. Annexation was an attempt to protect 
those Spanish assets. 
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that Castro would turn out to be a moderate. Although Batiste's regime had been a strong 
supporter of the United States in Latin America, the previous dictator had usurped the 
democratic processes in Cuba and was not a stellar performer as far as human rights and 
freedom of press were concerned. Castro came to Washington in April of 1959 and instantly 
became the darling of the press when he promised democracy and freedom of the press. 
While the American press lionized Castro in Washington, back home his regime was 
consolidating its power by purging the country of all remnants of Bastista's supporters as 
well as opposition contenders. Batiste had been in power for over seventeen years, 
consequently very few of the upper to upper middle class were immune from the subsequent 
terror. This resulted in a large flight of Cuban capital to Miami. Castro demanded the return 
of the "enemies of the revolution" but the United States declined. Castro responded by 
expropriating over a billion dollars worth of American owned property in Cuba. During 
1959 and 1960 Cuba also aided a series of revolution attempts in Panama, Guatemala, and 
the Dominican Republic. These combined with increasingly left leanings of Castro, made 
it apparent that he would not play ball with the United States. In December of 1959, the 
chief of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division, Joseph C. King, put forward a 
memorandum that insisted that "Castro's far left dictatorship could not be permitted to stand 
because it could encourage expropriations of American property in other Latin American 
countries." The anti-Castro idea was carried by Allen Dulles to the 5412 Group meeting on 
13 Jan I9608, and despite reservations from State Department representatives, the idea was 
conditionally approved. (Prados 1986, p. 176) 
2. Operation Pluto 
At the heart of Operation Pluto was the CIA's top secret policy paper, "A Program 
of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime." This paper called for four steps: (1) creation 
of a "responsible and unified" Cuban government in exile; (2) "a powerful propaganda 
8The 5412 Group was a NSC clearinghouse organization for covert operations 
composed of President Eisenhower's personal appointee's, senior members of the State 
Department and the Pentagon, plus the DCI. 
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offensive"; (3) "a covert intelligence and action organization" in Cuba to be "responsive" to 
the exile opposition; and (4) "a paramilitary force outside of Cuba for future guerrilla 
action." The document also called for a "small air supply capability under deep cover as a 
commercial operation in another country." (Wyden 1979,25.) 
The CIA requisitioned a 50-kilowatt transmitter from the U.S. Army in Germany and 
set it up on Swan Island located off the coast of Honduras. They also set up a recording 
studio in Miami and began to produce anti-Castro / anti-Communist material to be broadcast 
from the newly erected radio station. Within a month of the decision to go ahead with 
PLUTO, Cuba was being bombarded with propaganda encouraging the people to rise up and 
depose Castro. 
Meanwhile the CIA approached exiled Cubans who controlled political factions in 
Miami, attempting to forge a coalition government. These included: Manuel Aritime, 
leader of the Revolutionary Recovery Movement (MRR); Antonio de Varona, of the Rescate 
Movement; Sanchez Arango, who controlled the Triple A organization; and Dr. Justo 
Carrillo, who was the head of the Montecristi movement. Eventually it also included Manuel 
Ray, leader of the Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo (MRP). This group of Cubans 
represented the entire spectrum of Cuban political ideology ranging from de Verona on the 
right to Ray on the far left. The resulting Frente Revolucionario Democratico (FRD), was 
a tenuous collection of diverse groups each of whom needed the help of the United States to 
oust Castro from Cuba. 
Through the FRD, the CIA was able to recruit the initial cadre of paramilitary 
personnel. Originally it was thought that twenty to forty men could be trained as guerrilla 
leaders. Once trained, they would be equipped with radios and infiltrated into Cuba to 
consolidate and organize the resistance groups that were already being urged on by the 
propaganda campaign. This follows the pattern established by the Jedburghs during World 
War II. The critical difference is that this guerrilla force was expected to carry all the water 
with respect to the operation. There would be no large conventional force to spearhead the 
operations.   Initially it was thought that the propaganda campaign, combined with the 
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guerrilla organization supplied by covert means, would be enough to topple Castro. It soon 
became apparent that this was wishful thinking. There were early failures with the resupply 
missions and Castro was more adept at rooting out and destroying potential resistance than 
expected. 
Unable to produce the desired results, the CIA began a series of escalations to 
OPERATION PLUTO. It was decided that there would have to be a large assault force to 
act as a catalyst in the revolt against Castro. The resulting mission creep introduced a whole 
new set of variables and operational constraints upon the CIA. The first problem to surface 
was security. No longer were they talking about twenty to forty men; now the operation 
would involve over a thousand, at numerous locations. The job of recruiting and training 
them in secrecy became almost impossible. 
To handle increased requirements, the CIA set up large recruiting stations in Miami. 
Wyden describes the Cubans as not being able to do anything quietly. At one point some 
American youngsters tossed firecrackers into a Cuban recruiting camp near Homestead, FL. 
The trainees thought they were under attack from Castro's agents and burst out with rifles 
firing. An American youth was wounded. It took the intercession of Allen Dulles to keep 
the story out of the papers. (Wyden 1979, p. 45-46) 
Constrained by the Neutrality laws, the CIA needed to find a location outside the 
United States to train the growing Cuban force.9 The logical choice was Guatemala. The 
CIA had just engineered OPERATION SUCCESS which had brought Guatemalan President 
Miguel Ydigoras to power. He was only too happy to cooperate. Through Ydigoras, the 
CIA gained access to a large coffee plantation in Helvetia. Here, and in the surrounding 
mountains, the CIA eventually trained over 1400 recruits. 
To transport the Cubans and needed supplies from Miami to Guatemala in secret, the 
CIA created a new proprietary.  For approximately $300,000 the CIA bought all of the 
9The Neutrality Act states that the CIA cannot train indigenous forces for, or 
conduct operations against foreign governments from United States soil. 
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outstanding shares of Southern Air Transport.10 This air operation was strictly for logistic 
use. There was a separate rebel air force being formed in Retalhuleu, Guatemala about thirty 
miles from the training camp in Helvetia. 
Retalhuleu was an airfield built from scratch in the jungle of Guatemala. At a cost 
of $1.8 million the airfield eventually supported fifteen B-26 bombers, five C-46 and seven 
C-54 transports. One of the major problems that developed was the lack of trained flight 
crews. The CIA interviewed over ninety Cuban applicants but not all could be accepted. In 
order to make up the difference, the CIA turned to Major General George Doster, 
commander of the Alabama Air National Guard to recruit American crews that could be used 
in OPERATION PLUTO.11 Within forty-five days General Doster succeeded in recruiting 
eighty Americans with experience in B-26 and C-54 aircraft. These men then joined the 
Cubans at Retalhuleu. (Wyden 1979, p. 184) 
OPERATION PLUTO also needed a naval component. Southern Air Transport 
would not be available to use in actual combat, and the rebel air force was not large enough 
to support all the logistical requirements of a large scale invasion. To shore up this logistical 
shortfall, the CIA acquired another faltering company called Mineral Carriers. Mineral 
Carriers owned two converted landing craft infantry (LCI) left over from World War II. 
Each was capable of carrying about 200 men and approximately 250 tons of supplies. The 
CIA also requisitioned the U.S.S. San Marcos, a 450-foot LSD (landing ship dock) from the 
US Navy. Additionally, they recruited the Garcia Line Corporation which was the only 
Cuban line still running rice and sugar out of Havana. Garcia had six freighters that provided 
excellent cover. Garcia had been using one of his ships, the Rio Escondido, to exfiltrate anti- 
Cuban leaders whom the CIA wanted out of Cuba. The concept of operations called for the 
"American" LSD to bring landing craft to pick up the troops from the Garcia freighters and 
the two LCI's and carry them to the beaches. 
10It was felt that if military aircraft were used, security would be compromised. 
uThe Alabama Air National Guard was the last American unit to fly the aging B- 
26 bomber. 
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Originally the Cuban recruits were told that they were being supported by friendly 
American business interests. All official government sponsorship was denied. The size of 
the operation now made it impossible to hide the fact that the resources of the United States 
were being used to support this operation. The expanding size of the operation in Guatemala 
also presented external security problems. On 10 January 1960 the New York Times 
headlines read, "U.S. Helps Train an Anti-Castro Force at Secret Guatemalan Air -Ground 
Base." Photo's of the air base that were originally taken to stimulate recruiting found their 
way into Miami newspapers. If these public exposures did not get Castro's attention, the use 
of the rebel brigade to quell an internal uprising against Ydigoras in Guatemala must have. 
As time progressed there were numerous articles and pictures published throughout the 
country concerning the goings-on in Guatemala. In reality, it was no longer possible to 
consider OPERATION PLUTO a covert or even clandestine operation, yet the CIA pressed 
on, believing that they could still pull off the operation. 
One of the major factors behind this belief was the tremendous political pressure 
being applied to the CIA. Vice President Nixon was pressing the CIA for a solution to the 
Cuban problem. It was hoped that the CIA could emulate the Guatemalan experience and 
deliver a quick victory before the election. Under pressure to produce, the CIA decided to 
escalate the PLUTO operation again. It was at this point that a crucial mistake was made. 
In order to produce a quick and decisive result, the insurgency effort was totally abandoned 
in favor of a conventional amphibious assault. The plan now looked entirely different than 
it had a few months earlier. 
In retrospect, it seems ludicrous to expect a force of some 1400 conventionally 
trained exiles to prevail in an open attack against a regime that had for the most part 
consolidated its political position, and possessed the assets to defend itself. In late 1960 
however, it was becoming painfully obvious that the guerrilla option was not going to work 
by itself. Latent resistance was not strong enough to be mobilized in the time span that 
politics demanded. Castro's anti-American rhetoric was increasing and the fledgling Kennedy 
Administration was feeling political pressure from the Cuban lobby, as well as bureaucratic 
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pressure from the CIA to go forward with the plan started by Eisenhower. Instead of giving 
the guerrilla option time to work on its own, the plan was accelerated by escalating the 
operation to include a frontal assault. It was thought the assault would facilitate the 
overthrow of Castro. Once the conventional mindset entered calculus, the operation was 
escalated again. This was manifested by a pure amphibious assault that totally abandoned 
the insurgent component. The CIA was now out of its element. They needed help. 
Correctly they turned to the military, but failed to let the military all the way in. Given the 
information supplied by the CIA, the Joint Staff endorsed the amphibious concept of 
operations. The limited staff that was allowed to look at pieces of the plan saw it in terms 
of a conventional operation. There was no reason to believe that an amphibious landing 
would not be successful. World War II had proven that the United States had no equal in this 
endeavor. The JCS was not fully aware of the political context that the CIA was operating 
in. Meaning they felt that eventually the military would have to be called in, and that the full 
weight of American support would be evident. The CIA on the other hand, still looked at 
PLUTO as a high leverage operation. In other words, they still thought they could still pull 
it off with minimum assets and minimum political exposure. They clung to operational 
assumptions that were valid for unconventional warfare after they escalated the operation to 
the conventional realm. These assumptions were reinforced when the JCS endorsed their 
concept of operations. Ultimately, disparity between operational and political reality led to 
the fiasco known as the Bay of Pigs. 
B.        ANALYSIS 
The results of this study reaffirms many of the criteria outlined in the previous 
chapter. In Contrast to the Jedburgh example, where most of the criteria were seen in a 
positive light, many of the criteria in the Cuban case were evident in a negative sense. 
1. Strategic Criteria 
In terms of strategic criteria Cuba seems to fall within the broad policy objectives of 
the United States. The strategic premise that Eisenhower and Kennedy were operating under 
was the containment of communism.  Eisenhower's justification to go forward with the 
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planning for a program to eliminate Castro's regime was based on a belief that he was 
fighting communism. Most reports indicated that Castro was not a communist despite leftist 
tendencies. However, it was felt that Castro would eventually gravitate toward the 
communist camp if active measures were not taken to stop him. A communist presence so 
close to the United States wasseen as intolerable. The reality that Cuba was not, and could 
not be, a lethal threat (until the introduction of nuclear weapons in 1961) diminished the 
political and military options. At the time, the benefits that could be derived by deposing 
Castro did not warrrant a full scale intervention by the United States. There was 
determination on part of the American administrations to get rid of Castro, but neither was 
willing to overtly escalate the conflict to the point of possible conflict with the Soviet Union. 
Prior to the Cuban Missle Crisis, both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations were 
very conscience of the international political backlash that would ensue if they were to 
invade Cuba outright. The United States has a strong imperialist reputation in Latin 
America, especially in Cuba. This dates back to the Spanish American War. The idea of 
overt intervention into Cuba was seen as politically impossible at the time. Ironically, the 
Kennedy administration probably would have had the domestic support if he had asked. In 
1961, the "Red Scare" was still a powerful tool to elicit fear and stir up nationalistic 
sentiments. The early American support that Castro received when he first came to power 
in 1959 had diminished as Castro's anti-American policies became more pronounced. Since 
the United States limited itself politically, it could not overtly bring its full economic and 
military power to bear. 
2. Operational Criteria 
In the preceding chapter operational criteria were described as those that defined the 
possible in terms of organizational space. In the Cuban scenario the operational constraints 
were severe. First, there was not a permissive environment within Cuba to mobilize popular 
support. On Jan 1,1959 most Cubans were overjoyed with the fall of Batiste. His corrupt 
regime had been in place since 1934 and the people wanted change. Before Castro emerged 
as the victor, there had been over 25 revolutionary groups contending for power. Initially 
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there may have been an opportunity to rally the other groups against Castro, but that quickly 
passed as the United States adopted a wait and see attitude. As Eisenhower took a cautious 
look, Castro was busy consolidating control. Mock trials and summary executions were 
frequent during the first months of the new regime. Seventy-five enemies of the revolution 
were machine gunned into a freshly bulldozed pit in Oriente, while 250 more were executed 
in Santiago de Cuba in the first few days. (Lazo 1968, p. 191) As the months went on, 
Castro was very effective in suppressing his enemies. 
Aside from the outright executions, Castro used the "labor reforms" to justify the 
government intervening in a number of private businesses. Castro soon had control of the 
newspapers and other media organizations that he used to silence the opposition. Unable to 
speak openly, opposition leaders were forced underground. Those that could not survive in 
that environment were soon caught by the regime, or departed for the safety of Miami. 
Land reform was carried out under the guise of anti-American expropriations. Castro 
confiscated over $25 billion worth of privately owned property. Almost $1 billion of this 
was owned by Americans. (Lazo 1968, p. 240) The effect was to plunder the Cuban middle 
class. As Wickam-Crowley has pointed out, leaders of insurgencies tend to come from the 
middle class. The middle class is also where insurgencies derive their financial and human 
capital to sustain the movement.12 After Castro took control, this pool of capital either fled 
or was eliminated. This had the effect of decreasing the mobilization potential inside of 
Cuba to almost zero. There were a few groups such as Manuel Ray's MRP operating 
underground, but their financing was weak, and number of recruits limited. Eventually, to 
sustain any type of organization Ray fled to Miami to tap into the financial and human 
capital that resided there. 
The CIA found a plethora of mobilization potential in Miami and assumed that it 
would be the same inside Cuba. Consistently the United States buys into the peasant theory 
of revolution. The CIA assumed the peasants would be willing to rise up at the slightest 
12See Guerrillas & Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of 
Insurgents and Regimes since 1956. (1992). 
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provocation. This was wrong. The Cuban middle class was the revolutionary body and not 
the peasant. Castro's effectiveness in routing out the middle class was underestimated. The 
fact is that there was no significant counter-revolutionary potential left in Cuba after the 
collapse of the middle class. 
The second operational criteria postulates that a parallel operational vision is required 
to allow all participants to achieve their minimum or maximum objectives. At first glance 
this seems to be the case during OPERATION PLUTO. All of the players to include the 
Kennedy administration, the CIA, and all the coalition factions in Miami, felt that the 
removal of Castro was essential to their personal plans for Cuba. What they were not able 
to agree on was the specifics of implementation and the role each should play during and 
after the invasion. As stated earlier, the administration and the CIA wanted to maintain a low 
profile while at the same time keeping tight control over the specifics of the operation. From 
all appearances, the minimum objectives for the United States was the removal of Castro 
from power. The maximum objective was the removal of Castro and the installation of a 
liberal regime friendly to the United States without any political backlash. For the exiled 
Cubans, the minimum goal was deposing Castro. The Cuban maximum objective was 
defined not as a coalition government, but by each faction as gaining control of Cuba for 
itself. 
Both parties agreed on the minimum objective but the program was not designed to 
satisfy the minimum. The United States was trying for its maximum. The exiled Cubans 
realized this but went along to satisfice their minimal objectives. If the invasion had worked 
and Castro had been ousted, who would the United States have supported? Certainly it 
would not have been the pro-Batiste faction. It also would not have been Ray's MRP who 
advocated "fidelisimo without fidel." The Cubans must have suspected as much. They knew 
that a coalition government was impossible. The diversity of ideology was too great. They 
went along with the Americans because they had no other way to accomplish their minimal 
objectives. 
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For their part, the Cubans were not interested in political fallout. They wanted to 
politicize their situation and exercise control of the operation. The Cubans first choice would 
have been to use the overt power of the United States to dispose of Castro. Once that was 
done, there would be an internal consolidation and one faction would come to power. 
Barring that, their preference was for the United States to supply them with money and arms 
and let them proceed as they saw fit. As it turned out, the Cubans were forced to accept the 
CIA's concept of operations as the price of US involvement. 
3. Tactical Criteria 
Because paramilitary forces are weak in comparison to regular forces, they need a 
veil of anonymity. Tactically this translates to the need to be able to operate in a secure 
environment. As an operation expands, the span of control for security becomes harder to 
control. OPERATION PLUTO grew beyond the bounds of the CIA's ability to control the 
security environment. By expanding the operation to include a separate Air Force, Navy, 
and multiple operating locations, there was no way to effectively keep the operation from 
leaking. This meant that the invading force was vulnerable to attack. Although the guerrilla 
option was abandoned, the CIA never adjusted the required force levels to compensate for 
the changed nature of the operation. Closely related to the security issue is that of logistics. 
Because the guerrilla depends on anonymity, he is required to have a logistics system that 
allows him to remain unidentified. For the most part, the CIA was able to maintain this 
logistics system until the operation grew beyond their capability. Even at its earliest stages, 
OPERATION PLUTO represented a major challenge for logistics. As the operation grew 
to include a rebel air force, a clandestine navy, along with 1400 troops, the bill was almost 
impossible to fill. To its credit, the CIA succeeded in creating the rebel air force and built 
a small naval task force. Unfortunately, it was too small to carry out the assigned objective. 
C.       SUMMARY 
The Cuban case clearly demonstrates the political and military constraints imposed 
by a Type B conflict scenario. Kennedy was unwilling to escalate the conflict to the level 
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of a Type A scenario because it simply did not offer the rewards associated with those types 
of risks. It was not worth expending the political capital needed to attain the desired results. 
At the same time, he desperately wanted to deliver a solution to the Cuban problem. The 
CIA offered an option that might allow him to achieve his goal without escalating to Type 
A conflict. Unfortunately neither the President, nor the CIA possessed the patience to allow 
a true guerrilla option to develop. In order to get results, they ignored, or misinterpreted, 
many of the criteria that are essential if paramilitary option is going to be used. 
Operationally, the CIA was relying on an inherent mobilization potential inside of 
Cuba. As we have seen, the potential was just not there. The operational vision between 
the United States and the exiled Cubans contained inconsistencies. The Cubans wanted the 
U.S. to use its power to remove Castro outright. The United States on the other hand, was 
intent on a clandestine operation to provide plausible denial. As it turned out, neither party 
got what it wanted. It seems increasingly important to the success of such operations that 
there be a common operational strategy that will allow each party to realize their objectives. 
Perhaps the most important lesson to take away from the Cuban experience is the 
lesson of asymmetric motivation. When an operation is designed to directly overthrow an 
incumbent regime, that regime will perceive the threat as lethal. It will resist as it would in 
a total war scenario. This presents a dilemma for the intervenor when it considers the 
objective as a limited engagement. By using a paramilitary force, the intervenor concedes 
superior strength to the defending regime in most cases. In order to overcome this lack of 
strength, it is imperative that the paramilitary operations be grounded with a solid strategic 
policy. The force must also be superior in terms of operational and tactical skills. This is 
what happened at the Bay of Pigs. The United States tried to achieve an ultimate objective 
using a limited force. The operational assumptions were flawed in the belief that there was 
sufficient latent resistance to Castro's regime. Tactically, the invading forces lacked 
sufficient strength, logistics, and surprise to achieve their stated objectives. The nature of 
of paramilitary operations mandates that without the support of the indiginous people, they 
can only be used to achieve minimal short term objectives.   They can also be used to 
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augment regular forces, but they cannot be required achieve unlimited objectives by 
themselves. 
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IV. TYPE C ENVIRONMENT 
Type C environments are the most constrained in terms of political flexibility. As 
the overt threats to our nation diminish, there is a corresponding pressure to use restricted 
means to achieve our objectives. This was evident during the eighties with respect to the 
United States policy toward Nicaragua. Posing no lethal threat to the United States, the 
Carter, and later the Reagan Administrations, were constrained from using the military to 
achieve their objectives in Nicaragua. Pressed between doing nothing and having to do 
"something", the United States turned to the paramilitary option. 
A.       NICARAGUA 
When the Sandinista's took control of Managua in 1979, it was the latest in a long 
succession of political pendulum swings from the Conservative to the Liberal Party. This 
time, however, was different in that they reversed more than a century of caudillo politics 
inherited from colonial Spain. In its place, they introduced a Marxist-Lenninst bureaucratic 
regime. Closely aligned with Cuba, the Sandinistas, it appeared, were determined to spread 
revolution to the rest of Central America. This "communist beach head" in Nicaragua 
threatened to undermine regional stability in Latin America. Initial attempts by the Carter 
Administration to promote political moderation through economic incentives failed.13 
Encouraged by Cuba, the USSR, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Nicaragua 
continued to gravitate toward the "socialist" camp. This evolution eventually brought 
Nicaragua into direct confrontation with the newly elected Reagan Administration bent on 
restoring stability while at the same time rolling back communist gains. 
"Through the Inter-American Development Bank the United States voted for all 
loans proposed to Nicaragua. The bank gave the Sandinistas $262 million in the last 
nineteen months of the Carter Administration, almost twice the amount it gave the 
Somoza government in the nineteen previous years ($134 million) 
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1. History 
Prior to 1900, in the spirit of Manifest Destiny, the United States had been pressing 
hard to stabilize a hegemonic position in the Caribbean Basin. The reasons for this were 
later expressed well by Assistant Secretary of State, Robert Olds in 1927. 
Geographical facts cannot be ignored. The Central American area down to 
and including the Isthmus of Panama constitutes a legitimate sphere of 
influence for the United States; if we are to have due regard for our own 
safety and protection.... Call it a sphere of influence, or what you will, we 
do control the destines of Central America, and we do it for the simple reason 
that the national interest absolutely dictates such a course. (Tierney 1982, p. 
6) 
This desire for regional hegemony had been effectively blocked by Spain and England prior 
to the early 1900's. By the turn of the century, the favorable end of the Spanish-American 
War, and a rising German threat to the British, combined to create the conditions that made 
it possible for the United States to effectively exert dominant influence over the Caribbean. 
The Panama canal was the instrument of American control in Central America and the 
Caribbean Basin. To protect and maintain this control, the United States relied on a strategy 
of intervention that reflected two central themes: the need to restrain internal political revolt; 
and to prevent foreign military interference. 
In 1909 the United Sates first intervened in Nicaragua on behalf of rebels who 
opposed the regime of Jose Santa Zelaya. Zelaya was a Liberal dictator that had turned 
Nicaragua into a Central American military power. He had pressured the British to leave and 
then occupied the entire country. He organized a strong militia and by 1907 was strong 
enough to defeat both the Honduran and Salvadoran armies together. This expansionism was 
running directly counter to the U.S. goal of regional stability and peace. Under the pretense 
of protecting American lives and property, the U.S. Marines landed at the town of Bluefields 
on the Southeast coast of Nicaragua. They secured the town for rebels to use as a sanctuary. 
By December of 1909, Zelaya realized that he could not win militarily and resigned in favor 
42 
of another member of the Liberal Party. Washington refused to recognize the new appointee 
and the war continued. Protected by 400 Marines, the rebels soon forced the government in 
Managua to step down. The resulting coalition government was headed by a liberal named 
General Juan J. Estrada who promised to hold free elections within two years. By mid 1911 
the U.S. had taken control of the Nicaraguan economy. The United States secured loans on 
behalf of Nicaragua totaling more than $1.5 million. (Tierney 1982, p. 8) This combined 
with other measures stabilized the economy and it looked as if American intervention into 
the Central American civil war was a success. The peace was not to last. 
Within a year, conservative members of the coalition government staged a successful 
coup d'etat. Following United States recognition of the new government, dissatisfied 
elements of the Army loyal to the Liberal Party launched another revolution. The 
Nicaraguan government requested U.S. intervention and Washington responded by sending 
2,700 troops to Bluefields again in August of 1912. After landing on the eastern coast, a 
Marine battalion proceeded to Managua where it quickly put down the insurrection. The 
Marines withdrew but left a Legation Guard of 100 troops that kept the peace for the next 
thirteen years. This American military presence would prove to have lasting effects on future 
U.S. / Nicaraguan relationships. 
United States policy in Nicaragua fixated on preserving order and stability. To 
achieve this stability, the United States was dependent upon Nicaragua's dominant 
Conservative Party. The Conservatives, in turn, relied upon the United States to support and 
to justify their continued hold on the politics of the country. (Tierney 1982, p. 10) Liberals 
came to see the United States as an evil force that supported a regime determined to keep 
them out of power. 
By 1925 the United States had emerged from World War I with better relations with 
Britain and Japan and was less concerned with foreign intervention into Central America. 
Despite this reduced threat, the United States still worried about stability in the region 
surrounding the Panama canal. To preserve the peace in Nicaragua after the United States 
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pulled out, an apolitical body that could ensure democratic transitions between the Liberal 
and Conservative Parties of Nicaragua was created. The Guardia Nacional was a military 
body composed of liberal and conservative members. Its leader was a member of the Liberal 
Party named Anastasio Somoza Garcia. 
Predictably, once the United States departed in 1926, the elected conservative 
President, Carlos Solörzno, came under attack by rival conservative General Chamorro. 
Within five months Solörzno was force to resign and Chamorro assumed the Presidency. It 
almost an exact repeat of 1909, Chamorro's government was not recognized by the United 
States and Liberals led by Jose M. Moncada, began the inevitable uprising with the support 
of Mexico. Lacking American support, Chamorro stepped down in favor of fellow 
conservative Adolfo Diaz. 
Mexico had undergone a revolution in 1910 and many Americans believed that 
Mexico was dominated by "Bolshevism", fueling fears inside the State Department that 
Mexico was out to challenge U.S. hegemony in Central America. (Tierney 1982, p. 14) Diaz 
appealed to the United States for help in putting down the Liberal challenge. The United 
States responded with over 3,000 Marines. Bolstered by the Marines, the Guardia soon 
forced the Liberals to negotiate a truce. The only hold outs were formed into a band led by 
Augusto Sandino. 
As a young man Sandino left Nicaragua to live in Honduras. Trouble with the law 
caused him to relocate in Guatemala where he worked for the United Fruit Company. It was 
here that he became acquainted with the workers' grievances against U.S. "imperialism." 
Later, after moving to Mexico, Sandino became exposed to a variety of radical political 
movements. In 1926 when the civil war broke out in Nicaragua, and America threatened a 
second military intervention, Sandino knew he had to return to his country and fight for 
freedom against American domination. With his entire life savings of about three hundred 
dollars, he bought arms in Honduras and equipped a band of twenty-nine men. (Tierney 
1982, p. 14) These were the original Sandinistas. Sandino's initial engagements resulted in 
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defeats and he was forced to join with Moncada's army. When Moncada decided to 
negotiate with the United States, Sandino refused to cooperate. He called Moncada a traitor 
and fled with his band into the hills so that they could continue the fight against American 
intervention using guerrilla tactics. 
In what has become a common mistake, the United States underestimated the amount 
of local support that a guerrilla organization could derive. Two months after Sandino and 
his thirty men fled to the hills of northern Nicaragua, Sandino and a group of 300 guerrillas 
attacked the town of Octal. Octal was being defended by close to ninety Marines and 
members of the Guardia. Running out of ammunition, the guerrillas quickly forced the 
defenders into a desperate situation. They would have been destroyed except that two U.S. 
airplanes spotted the battle and returned to Managua for help. Five American de Haviland 
bombers were dispatched to Octal to strafe and bomb the Sandinistas. In the end, over two 
hundred of the guerrillas were killed. News agencies reported that Americans were 
slaughtering helpless Nicaraguan peasants. Sandino's popularity soared. As he successfully 
evaded U.S. attempts to capture him for over seven years, Sandino attained almost folk-hero 
status for the international left-wing of the 1920's. (Tierney 1982, p. 20) 
The guerrilla war lasted for seven years between 1927 and 1933. As time went on, 
Sandino's cause was taken up as a rallying cry for the Latin American left. Fueled by myth, 
Sandino's popularity was actually greater outside of Nicaragua than at home. There seems 
to be little evidence that majority of Nicaraguans supported Sandino. U.S. presence brought 
the stability needed to hold fair elections. Moncada was elected by popular vote bringing the 
Liberal Party to power. The United States first intervened on behalf of the Conservative 
Party and ironically created the conditions whereby the Liberals could achieve power. 
Despite this, the United States found it harder and harder to justify its policy of intervention 
against the intense propaganda being promulgated throughout the international and domestic 
communities. With eerie foreshadowing of a later guerrilla war, American policy makers 
reappraised the U.S. role in Nicaragua and decided on a gradual phaseout concurrent with 
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a "Nicaraguanization" of the war against Sandino. By 1930 only about 1,200 Marines 
remained. Sandino had always used American intervention as the crux of his argument for 
continuing to fight. It was felt that if the United States withdrew, there would be little 
justification for Sandino to continue. In the end, it did not matter to the United States which 
party was in power as long as it could maintain stability. This lesson was understood by the 
leader of the Guardia Nacional, Anastasio Somoza Garcia. 
Upon withdrawal of the United States, Sandino was persuaded to come in from the 
hills for negotiations. As he left the negotiations, he was gunned down by the Guardia. Just 
like that the Sandinistas were finished. With the primary threat to the Nicaraguan 
government eliminated, Somoza turned his Guardia to the task of securing power for himself. 
In 1936 he engineered the President's resignation and then held elections. The Conservative 
party including ex-Presidents Chamorro and Diaz, appealed to the United States to supervise 
the elections but were refused. The elections were supervised by the Guardia, and Somoza 
was elected President January 1,1937. For the next forty-two years through the use of the 
Guardia Nacional, and the blessing of the American government, the Somoza family ruled 
Nicaragua with virtually a freehand as long as stability was preserved. 
The success of the Cuban revolution in 1959 inspired a new generation of Nicaraguan 
rebels. These "new" Sandinistas were a coalition of revolutionaries with different ideologies. 
The first were the Guerra Popular Prolongada (GPP) who subscribed to the foco theory. 
The GPP believed that a classic guerrilla war was necessary to overcome the reactionary 
forces of Somoza's National Guard and to prevent foreign intervention by the United States. 
The second group formed after disillusionment with the rural approach. The Tendencia 
Proletaria (TP), led by Jaime Wheelock, felt the urban workers held the key to Nicaragua's 
future. This urban based organization called for a Marxist-Lenninst approach. Somoza's 
counter revolutionary forces were brutally efficient at keeping both of these factions of the 
FSLN at bay. By 1974, Humberto Ortega and his brother Daniel inspired a third group 
within the FSLN known as Tendencia Insurreccional (TI or Tercerista). This group was able 
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to bridge the gap between the GPP and the TP. The Terceristas forged a coalition that 
combined the urban and rural components of the FSLN. Espousing democratic socialism as 
their goal for Nicaragua, The FSLN was now in a position to take advantage of new U.S. 
foreign policy objectives. The Carter administration's emphasis on human rights brought 
Somoza's regime under tight scrutiny. In April, the Administration delayed shipments of 
military hardware on the grounds that human rights were being ignored. 
Encouraged that the United States would not support Somoza, the Sandinistas seized 
the opportunity to exploit their position. With Cuban support, the FSLN seized power in 
July of 1979. Almost immediately Nicaragua embarked on an unprecedented military 
buildup.14 Neighboring countries began to sound the alarm. El Salvador's Ambassador to 
the United Nations told the UN General Assembly, 
In approximately three years, under the pretext of national defense, Nicaragua 
has acquired offensive weapons whose combined power is greater that of all 
the other Central American States, with the sole aim of implanting Marxism- 
Leninism in the region on a permanent basis, through violence, and with 
impunity, knowing that with such an imbalance of forces the other Central 
American countries, if they have to rely on their own resources, cannot stand 
up to this machinery of war and expansion. (Turner 1987, p. 19) 
2. Mission 
The Reagan administration was not ready for a direct military confrontation with 
Cuba,   nor were they willing to sit by and do nothing.   Covert action allowed the 
14Jiri Valenta and Virginia Valenta, "Sandinistas in Power," Problems of 
Communism, Sept-October 1985, p.23 "There appears to be a rough division of labor 
among the communist states that give security assistance to Nicaragua-a pattern also 
observed in Soviet-bloc dealings with such 'socialist-orientated' countries as Angola, 
Ethiopia and (formerly) Grenada. The Soviets appear to be responsible for overall 
command and control; the Cubans provide manpower and serve as military and counter- 
intelligence advisors; the East Germans provide trucks, policy specialists, and highly 
qualified communications technicians; the Bulgarians aid the processing of information 
in security matters; and Bulgaria and (to a lessor degree) Czechoslovakia provide 
explosives and ammunition." 
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Administration to act without having to spend the political capital required for an overt 
action. Building on an earlier finding by the President Carter, President Reagan signed a 
finding that provided money and backing to encourage and embolden the political 
opposition. It was hoped that coercive pressure would force the Sandinistas to make 
concessions and adopt a more moderate political stance. 
Originally El Salvador, and not Nicaragua was targeted. Through Nicaragua, Cuba 
was supplying leftist guerrillas of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) 
in an insurgency against the civilian-military hunta that governed El Salvador. In March of 
1981, President Reagan signed a top-secret finding that authorized propaganda and political 
support to the moderate Christian Democrats and military officers that were opposed to the 
guerrillas. The United States attempted to moderate the Sandinista's support to the FMLN 
by withholding $15 million in economic aid promised by the Carter Administration. The 
Sandinistas were not about to give up on their revolutionary vision for $15 million, and told 
representatives of the United States that Nicaragua had a right to its own foreign policy and 
that American aid should not be used as blackmail.15 Nicaragua continued to funnel arms 
and supplies to the FMLN. The next step in the covert war in Latin America would be the 
introduction of a paramilitary force designed to undermine the ability of the Nicaraguan 
government to support the FMLN. 
The covert program combined three proposals. First the CIA lobbied for the 
formation of a 500 man U.S.-supervised force on the Honduran border. This group was to 
be composed of Cubans and Nicaraguans not associated with the Somoza regime. The CIA 
also proposed secret assistance to a larger paramilitary force of ex-Nicaraguan National 
Guardsmen already being formed with help from Argentina, Honduras, Venezuela and 
Colombia. The third proposal called for an increase in financial support for political 
moderates begun under the Carter Administration. In November of 1981, President Reagan 
"Conversation between U.S. Ambassador Lawrence Pezzullo and Nicaraguan 
Minister of Agricultural Development. (Woodward 1987, p. 114) 
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signed National Security Decision Directive 17, which incorporated the third proposal and 
authorized assistance to one or both paramilitary forces. (Peterzell 1984, p. 75) 
The CIA decided that the most expedient method to get the Contras organized was 
to piggy back on the Argentine effort. They already had a Honduran infrastructure in place 
and U.S. involvement could be more readily concealed. Small scale harassment operations 
had been going on for over two years and had mostly been ineffective. Given U.S. help, it 
might be possible for these anti-Sandinistas to keep Managua off balance. There were 
drawbacks to this course of action. It was recognized that a paramilitary force composed of 
former Somoza supporters would never have widespread indigenous appeal. However the 
initial operational concept sold by CIA to the Administration, and laid out for the 
Intelligence Oversight Committee's, was one of interdiction and not political overthrow. 
Within four months of U.S. involvement, serious cross boarder operations into 
Nicaragua began. The first targets were the Rio Negro Bridge near Somotillo, and the Rio 
Coco Bridge near Ocotal. Both were major bridges in terms of logistical importance to the 
Sandinistas. During the next several months, the Contra groups were expanded and armed 
with U.S.-made M-16's, Belgian FAL automatic rifles, M-79 grenade launchers, mortars, and 
machine guns. In April, an NSC summary paper on the destabilization program reported that 
"in Nicaragua, the Sandinistas are under growing pressure thanks to our covert efforts." 
(Robinson 1987, p. 50) In the face of what now seemed an organized resistance, the 
Sandinista's countered by declaring a state of emergency and clamping down on the local 
press while beginning a concerted effort to smash the many small groups that opposed them. 
All rebel attacks had centered in the eastern part of the country. The towns of San Carlos and 
Bilwascarma, were occupied by exile troops. The Sandinista's counterattacked and 
recaptured the towns. To pacify the local areas, the Sandinistas began the relocation of 
approximately 10,000 Miskitos Indians from villages along the eastern border with Honduras 
to camps away from border. This relocation effort has been the source of scores of human 
rights violations allegations against the Sandinistas. (Peterzall 1984, p. 81) It also led to the 
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mobilization of a third anti-Sandinista coalition called the MISURA which are aligned with 
the FDN.16 
William Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), believed that ultimately 
the Contra's efforts would not be enough. To achieve the"rollback" implications that the 
Reagan foreign policy objectives demanded, eventually there would have to be a political 
force that could mobilize support to overthrow the Sandinista regime. As he moved the CIA 
toward that end, Casey ran into resistance at home. 
In May of 1983 Casey was called before the House Intelligence Committees where 
they made known that their interpretation of recent escalations in the covet war were 
beyond the scope of the original Presidential finding. Despite a move by the House 
Committee to cut all funding, there was a compromise. Contingent upon the President 
issuing a new clarifying finding within the next five months, an additional $19 million was 
allocated to the Contra project These funds were subject to the Boland Amendment which 
prohibited the CIA from spending funds that directly contributed to the overthrow of the 
Nicaraguan government. (Woodward 1987, p. 279) 
With this tentative support from Congress and five months to press the Sandinistas 
before a new finding was required, the CIA intensified efforts to give the Contras some 
political context, arguing that armed bands roaming the mountains on hit-and-run missions 
were not going to make a real difference. (Woodward 1987, p. 445) The CIA pushed to 
further isolate the Sandinistas by extending support to Eden Pastora, the disaffected former 
member of the Sandinista Revolution. Pastora was now the leader of the Revolutionary 
Democratic Alliance (ARDE), based in Costa Rica. The ARDE was composed of former 
Sandinistas and anti-Somoza activists. If the Democratic National Front (FDN), based in 
Honduras and led by the former officers of Somoza's National Guard, and the smaller ARDE 
could find some common ground through ties to the United States, it was possible that there 
16MISURA is a coalition of the Miskitos, Rama, and Sumu Indian tribes. 
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might be the beginnings of a political consensus that could emerge as a moderate alternative 
to challenge the Sandinistas. 
To weaken the regime and enhance the opposition's position, the CIA supplied its 
two umbrella organizations, the FDN and the ARDE, with T-28, C-47, and Cessna 0-2 
aircraft.17 They also supplied a limited naval capability to carry out raids on ports and 
shipping.18 These new weapons were used to concentrate attacks on the economic 
infrastructure of the regime. Attacks that centered on the Sandinistas ability to import oil 
were particularly effective. Two aircraft raids were conducted on Puerto Sandino, a 
receiving point for oil deliveries to Nicaragua. At Corinto twenty-five thousand residents 
were temporarily forced from their homes after two speedboats raided the port. Firing at the 
shore, eight large storage tanks containing 3.4 million gallons of oil were set aflame. Soon 
afterward the Exxon Corporation ordered its own tankers to avoid Nicaraguan waters. 
(Prados 1986, p. 393) 
To press the Sandinistas over the edge, Langley ordered the ports of Nicaragua mined 
to cut off the bulk of Nicaragua's import trade. This was accomplished through the use of 
the mother ship and the fast attack boats. On 3 January 1984, a Japanese flagged ship struck 
a mine outside of Corinto. This was the first of a dozen ships from six different nations to 
be damaged in the mining campaign. (Prados, 1986, p. 394) Congress presumed that the 
mining effort was undertaken by the ARDE and the FDN but in reality it was carried out by 
17To circumvent the Boland restrictions evidence suggests that the military 
declared the airplanes as surplus. This reduced them to having no "value". They were 
then transferred to a joint government project called "Elephant Herd"which served as a 
clearing house from which the CIA obtained the "surplus." 
18
 For this purpose the CIA obtained and outfitted a freighter with 
communications and navigation gear and equipment to launch a small flotilla of heavily 
armed, high speed motorboats. The mother ship acted as command post and could carry 
raiding parties to the more distant targets. It also carried an armed helicopter that could 
support the raids. This was paid for by the CIA contingency funds and as such was not 
subject to the restriction on the $19 million appropriation (Prados 1986, p. 392) 
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the CIA through the use of contract workers known as "unilaterally controlled Latino assets" 
(UCLA's). (Woodward 1987, p. 361) When this became public four months later, Congress 
refused to authorize another $21 million being sought by the Administration. 
In October of 1984 a Contra manual Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare 
was made public. This manual contained statements on "neutralization", implying 
assassination. This was the straw that broke the back of congressional support. Congress 
cut off funding to the Contras and banned any support, "directly or indirectly," until 
December of 1985. Obviously, this had a detrimental effect on the ability of the CIA to 
continue supporting the covert program. With the CIA officially out of the Contra business, 
it fell to the NSC to take a more active role in the conduct of the operation. The NSC secretly 
approached foreign governments to contribute funding directly to the Contra's.19 With the 
loss of public support and funding by the United States Congress, the strains on the fragile 
Contra coalition began to show. The FDN lost its alliance with the Miskitos Indians. When 
MISURA lost CIA funding, they sued for an accommodation with Managua. Tensions 
developed between the politically stronger FDN and the ARDE. Pastora had been unwilling 
to compromise with the FDN on the issue of working with former Somoza personnel. As 
funding became tight, the political and ideological divisions between the two organizations 
were exposed. In an attempt to capitalize on the United States' lack of public resolve and the 
Contra's divisiveness, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega flew to Moscow to ask for $200 
million in aid. (Woodward 1987, p. 464) Meanwhile the Contras were forced to continue in 
an almost hand to mouth manner throughout the remainder of 1984, 85, and much of 1986. 
Perhaps in response to embarrassment over the Soviet aid, and in an effort to stop the 
Sandinistas from decimating the Contras, Congress partially lifted the ban in December of 
19Woodward claims that National Security Advisor Robert C. McFarlane 
approached the Saudis and obtained at least $24 million in secret support. He also credits 
the Israeli's with providing several million dollars in financial and military aid. LTC 
Oliver North is reported to have made arrangements for South Korea and Taiwan to make 
contributions to the Contra's. 
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1985. It authorized limited assistance allowing the CIA to provide intelligence advice, 
communications equipment, and training. In addition, Congress authorized $27 million in 
humanitarian Contra assistance, including food, medical supplies and some transportation. 
By October of 1986 Congress had lifted the ban and authorized $100 million for the 
Contras. (Woodward 1987, p. 590) With support flowing freely, the Contras began to make 
significant gains. During 1987 they penetrated virtually every part of the country outside the 
Pacific coast and demonstrated widespread support among the peasant population. They 
inflicted heavy casualties on the Sandinista army and crippled its transportation network. 
In face of this mounting pressure from the Contras, combined with decreased Soviet support, 
the Sandinistas agreed to negotiations with the Contras in November of 1987. Meanwhile 
the roof was preparing to cave in on the CIA's program. In October a Contra supply plane 
was shot down by the Sandinista's. Eugene Hasenfus, the loadmaster, was captured. During 
a widely broadcast trial from Nicaragua, he claimed to be working for the CIA. Later that 
month came revelations that funds for the Contras were being illegally obtained through the 
sale of arms to Iran. As subsequent investigations occurred over the next three years, the 
ability of the United States to conduct the Contra program ceased. The Reagan, and 
subsequent Bush Administrations were forced to distance themselves. 
B.        ANALYSIS 
The Nicaraguan case study further illuminates many of the obstacles that must be 
overcome by the intervenor if it wishes to pursue a covert paramilitary option in a Type C 
scenario. 
1. Strategic Criteria 
If the strategic criteria depend on the political, military, and economic environment 
of the intervenor, then initially, the United States was in a solid position to pursue a 
paramilitary option in Nicaragua. President Reagan campaigned on a platform to strengthen 
U.S. intelligence assets, rebuild the United States military, and to get tough with the 
communists. President Carter had been practically run out of office because of intelligence 
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failures associated with Iran. Over the last six years the Soviets had made significant gains 
in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. They extended their influence in Africa through 
Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia. South Yemen and Afghanistan were also new additions 
to the Soviet sphere of influence. There was a very real perception that the United States was 
losing ground to the Soviets. On the tails of Reagan's election mandate, the Republicans 
gained a majority in the Senate. No one wanted to appear soft on communism. Perhaps the 
Democrats had cut the intelligence infrastructure too far after the Church Committee's 
indictment of the CIA? Maybe it was time to loosen the restraints? Whatever the reason, 
the United States was ready for a change in 1981. Accordingly, Reagan delivered an agent 
of change by selecting William Casey as DCI. Known as a champion of covert operations, 
he was unanimously approved by the Senate.20 There seems to be enough evidence to say 
Congress knew that the Administration was about to take a more active approach to foreign 
policy, and that covert action would be one of its instruments. 
Having been given tacit approval by Congress, the Administration was eager to blunt 
the most recent Soviet expansion into Central America. There was an intense need by the 
new Administration to do something. At the same time, politically, the United States could 
not unleash the military. Secretary of State Alexander Haig argued that the United States 
should impose a blockade of Cuba to stop the flow of arms to El Salvador through 
Nicaragua. He pleaded, "Go to the source.... Lay down a marker.... This one you can 
win." (Woodward 1987, p. 116) Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger wanted no part of 
a military solution. Vietnam still loomed large in American military psyche. The answer 
was found somewhere in between the two extremes. A covert paramilitary action to interdict 
the arms flow was proposed. President Reagan signed the finding and Congress was 
notified. 
Only after the operation evolved from interdiction and harassment, to one designed 
to overthrow the Nicaraguan government, did Congress balk. The reasons for the change 
20, Casey was a former OSS Jedburgh during WWII 
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will be discussed under operational criteria, but this evolution and escalation was critical. 
The Administration and the CIA cut Congress out of the process. Congress became 
suspicious and began to dig. When they found they had been lied to, they closed ranks and 
began to use the Contra program as a political stick with which to beat the Administration. 
When Congressman Edward P. Boland went public with the program on 8 December, 1982 
it was apparent that the Reagan Administration no longer had the political environment that 
would allow a covert operation in Nicaragua. The program was continued for eight more 
years by the overzealous, and sometimes illegal, efforts of determined operators. The fact 
that the operators had to resort to illegal means to circumvent the will of Congress is 
indicative of the importance satisfying the strategic criteria. 
2. Operational Criteria 
When the CIA notified Congress that it was going to conduct covert interdiction 
operations against Nicaragua it had an operational concept that would sell to Congress. It 
allowed them to support the Administration while at the same time providing themselves 
with political cover. If the program was discovered, it was within the basic policy lines that 
had been laid out and accepted by the public. Unfortunately, the covert program addressed 
the symptom but not the problem. Stopping the flow of weapons might slow the export of 
revolution, but what the Administration really wanted was a rollback of Soviet gains in 
Central America. To do this it was necessary make a dramatic change in the status quo. 
Toppling the Sandinistas would make a severe statement to the Cubans and the Soviets. Not 
willing to spend the political capital needed to push through such a policy, the 
Administration relied on gradual escalation in size and scope of the paramilitary operation 
shielding it from Congress. 
Although the decision to expand the goals of the program put the Administration at 
odds with Congress, it created the common operational vision required to recruit a coalition 
of Contras. The maximum objective of the United States (overthrow of the Sandinista 
regime) was the minimum objective of the Contras. TheContras were fighting to overthrow 
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the government and gain power for themselves. They would never fight just to interdict arms 
unless it would eventually lead to the fall of the Sandinistas. 
Given the minimum objectives for the Contras, the coalition members each had 
different maximums. The MISURA were primarily concerned with cultural and political 
autonomy. They were willing to concede power to the Sandinistas, or anyone else, as soon 
as they thought they could get autonomous concessions. The FDN, who's leadership was 
composed of former Somotista's, wanted to regain the power that they had lost in the 
Sandinista revolution. The ARDE was seeking to block Somoza's supporters from regaining 
their former status, while at the same time ascending to power themselves. These different 
factions provided a ready mobilization potential, but as in previous case studies, the 
coalitions were shaky at best. Once the minimum objective was met, it became almost 
impossible to hold the coalition together to form a political consensus. Despite the lack of 
political harmony, credit must be given to the Contra army. They were cohesive enough to 
endure the inconsistent, on again off again, foreign policy of the United States. 
Once again, the United States showed a lack of understanding of relative motivation. 
For the Sandinistas, the minimum acceptable outcome was the retention of power. As in the 
Cuban case, American minimum objectives in Nicaragua exceeded the threshold that the 
Sandinistas were willing to concede. It is improbable to think that a guerrilla force backed 
by the United States could overcome this asymmetry of motivation given that the United 
States Congress was publicly unwilling to support the Contra's minimum objectives. 
3. Tactical Criteria 
More than any other case that has been looked at, the security environment 
surrounding Nicaragua played a crucial role in the conduct of the paramilitary program. 
From the very beginning it was plain that the United States was involved. Prior to U.S. 
involvement the Contras were unable to mount much of a resistance. When bridges began 
to be blown simultaneously the Sandinistas knew they were getting outside help. Jaime 
Wheelock of the Sandinista ruling directorate stated, "there are too many things happening 
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at once to be a coincidence.... All these elements lead to one conclusion. The CIA is the 
only force with the power to do these things at once." (Woodward 1987, p. 405) After 
Congressman Boland leaked the program, there were a host of operational and tactical 
limitations. One telling example involved operational dealings with Saudi Arabia. The 
Administration approached the Saudis about the possibility of providing covert aid to the 
Contras. However, Saudi foreign policy was at odds with the Contra program. The 
Sandinistas were basically pro-Arab, while the two U.S. backed regimes in Costa Rica and 
El Salvador, had recently engaged unmistakable anti-Arab diplomacy and moved their 
embassies in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. If word should leak that Saudi Arabia was 
supporting an anti-Arab regime, it would be very embarrassing. The Saudis had no 
confidence that secrets could be kept in the Reagan Administration and initially refused the 
request. (Woodward 1987, p. 402) 
The fact that United States support for the Contras was common knowledge made it 
possible for the Sandinistas to exploit world opinion through skillful propaganda. This 
resulted in a ruling against the United States in the International Court of Justice.21 This led 
to further complications in terms of domestic Congressional support. Not only were there 
problems with our own organizations leaking, but there were also problems with the 
intermediaries that were used to facilitate the logistical flow between the diverse countries 
involved. Manucher Ghorbanifar, an Iranian middleman, eventually became disenchanted 
with the on-again / off-again U.S. policy. He leaked that the United States government and 
Israel were making substantial profits on the sale of arms to Iran and redistributing the 
proceeds to the Contra program. The resulting Iran-Contra affair was an intense 
embarrassment and had the potential to bring about the downfall of the President. 
21Nicaragua took the matter of the mining of its harbors along with the rest of the 
secret war to the World Court. The Court found the United States at fault. Subsequently 
the United States chose to disavow the jurisdiction of the Court. 
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More importantly, because the program leaked, it made it impossible for the 
Administration to back down without losing political clout. Once the veil of plausible 
deniability was pierced, it became futile to deny involvement. In effect, the United States 
President was held hostage to a questionable operation. Not only was the Administration 
required to support the Contras, but they also had to stick with El Salvador. This does not 
mean that it was not the intention of the Administration to stick to these programs, but there 
was a loss of strategic and operational flexibility. There could no longer be a graceful exit 
if the situation changed and a new policy was seen as more appropriate. 
C.       SUMMARY 
Nicaragua accentuates the need to have a strategic vision that is consistent with U.S. 
commitment. The quick covert fix is a fantasy. The paramilitary option will require that 
Congress support the program. Nicaragua also highlights the problems associated with 
putting together a political coalition that appeals to the diverse groups contending for power. 
It also reemphasis the critical nature of asymmetric motivation. When the minimum 
objectives of the intervenor exceed the maximum that the defender is willing to concede, the 
defender will resist with the full weight of its capability. It will be very difficult for the 
protege to achieve its ends with the limited force represented by paramilitary forces. Lastly, 
security was a dominant factor. Support for the Contras was one of this nations most 
publicized paramilitary efforts. This not only complicated the tactical operations, but it 
highlighted the political nature of paramilitary operations. One of the most basic reasons that 
politicians turn to covert action is to limit their political exposure. Once exposed, it makes 
little sense to continue in that mode of operation. Either the politician has misread the public 
and they do support the operation. Or the initial read was correct, and the public is 
indifferent, or does not support the program at all. The point is that once exposed, either it 
will be possible to escalat the program, or it will have to be abandoned. It is a two edged 
sword.   Proponents of the cause may want to leak in hopes of forcing an escalated 
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commitment, while foes may leak in hope of causing an abandonment.   In either case, it is 




The preceding chapters have attempted to induce a set of paramilitary criteria that are 
applicable across the spectrum of political environments. A through understanding of these 
criteria and their implications will allow political and military leaders to make informed 
decisions regarding their use. The criteria will also provide benchmarks to assess the future 
role that specific institutions should play in the conduct of these operations. 
Paramilitary operations must be understood as political tools. As such, they must be 
grounded within a political policy that is broadly understood and accepted by the public. In 
today's environment it is almost a given that a clandestine or covert program will eventually 
become public. Once paramilitary support has been provided, it is essential to minimize the 
possibility that a program can become hostage to domestic political backlash. As shown in 
Cuba and Nicaragua, the political effects can be potentially devastating if there is not a clear 
and identifiable linkage to a broader policy. In addition to being linked to a broad strategy, 
they must also carry the necessary weight of commitment by the Admisistration and 
Congress. 
There must also be reconciliation between the asymmetry of motivations. 
Recognizing that there are many competing interests, the intervenor must assess each 
potential protege in terms of their objectives before providing support. In other words, the 
protege's objectives must be justifiable under the intervenor's broadly understood political 
policy. Critics of paramilitary operations often cite the indiscriminate arming of factions 
with diverging long term interests from our own. Examples of this were the arming of French 
and Chinese communists during World War II, as well as the Somitistas in Nicaragua. Prior 
reconciliation of objectives would go along way toward correcting this. 
Before committing support, the intervenor must be willing to live within the 
boundaries of the protege's minimum and maximum objectives. These minimum objectives 
define the limits of cooperation that the protege will allow. Below the minimum threshold, 
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the prospective protege will be indifferent. He will likely accept any support that is offered, 
but he will not consent to being controlled by the intervenor. He will continue to 
independently pursue his minimum objectives, seeking help from anyone who will provide 
that minimum level of support. This may run counter to the political objectives of the 
intervenor. At the other end of the spectrum, the intervenor cannot expect to succeed when 
his minimum objectives exceed the maximum objectives of the protege. Once the maximum 
objectives of the protege are met, he will see further attempts to manipulate the situation as 
a threat to himself. In essence, he will bite the hand that fed him. 
Given that paramilitary operations, like all military operations, are political tools, 
they must be designed to achieve politically feasible ends. If the minimum acceptable 
objective is the total destruction of a regime, it must be assumed that the threatened regime 
will resist with all means available. In the case studied, the paramilitary force was 
inadequate to overcome the forces that could be brought to bear against it. This explains the 
dismal results of paramilitary action during Type B conflicts. Unlimited objectives demand 
means that are superior to the defending regime. If the objective allows a political 
compromise, it may be possible for paramilitary forces to play an important role. 
The previous case studies have shown the need for a permissive organizational 
environment. It seems evident that the intervenor cannot expect to carry out a offensive, or 
defensive, paramilitary operation without the sympathies of significant portions of the 
indigenous population. Cuba was a clear example of this. Castro was able to effectively rid 
Cuba of the opposition. Those that survived were concentrated in Miami and could not 
provide the support mechanisms necessary to ensure the guerrilla option. Subsequently, 
assumptions concerning the viability of a paramilitary force were in error. 
All cases reconfirmed the need for extensive logistical capability at all levels of 
conflict. The mechanisms become harder as the environment becomes more benign. This 
is an interesting paradox. During World War II when there was the largest physical threat, 
the logistical infrastructure was readily available to be tapped.  In comparison with the 
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conventional operations that were taking place, the support rendered to unconventional 
warfare was minuscule. As the environment changed, and the physical threat diminished, 
the overt support of the military was no longer available. The CIA had to set up elaborate 
front companies and make enormous investments in logistical capability. This included the 
acquisition of whole airlines and shipping companies. Without the declaration of hostilities, 
it was politically harder to tap the resources of the Defense Department. Special 
arrangements had to be made to acquire these services. Nicaragua showed the critical nature 
of logistics. After Congress denied the Administration the use of even the CIA's logistic 
capability, they were forced to create a private capability. Ultimately this private capability 
proved to be inadequate and the Contras were nearly forced to capitulate for lack of supplies. 
Only after Congress restored the ability of the U.S. to provide logistical support did a viable 
paramilitary infrastructure reappear. 
Aside from logistics, the cases have confirmed the importance of security in the 
tactical role. More importantly, they have shown that the ability to operate in a security 
environment has strategic implications as well. Exposure strips away the veil of anonymity 
for the policy maker. Once a clandestine operation is revealed, the political options are 
reduced to two. The program can be stopped as it was in Cuba, or it may be brought out into 
the open and fully supported. This is what happened in Nicaragua. The Reagan 
Administration was put in the position of having to expend political capital to keep the 
Contra program alive. Having invested this capital, the Administration was committed to 
a level of support commensurate with their rhetoric to save the program. In this case, it was 
the total removal of the Sandinista regime. There was no longer any room for compromise. 
Politics are about compromise. Once an acceptable option between the minimum and 
maximum allowable for both sides presents itself, it is imperative that the policy maker have 
the flexibility to accept that option. In the face of Sandinista compromises, the 
Administration was forced to continue to support the Contras when it may have been in our 
interests to reach an agreement. 
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What is important to take from these cases, is the recognition that the decision to use 
paramilitary forces is more a function of political constraints, rather than military necessity. 
Once this is clear, the above criteria provide easily identifiable standards to assess a 
particular paramilitary program. They also lend themselves to being used as tools to gauge 
the effectiveness of possible institutions to conduct these operations. As political constraints 
mount, leaders will have less flexibility in terms of traditional responses. In order to do 
"something", they will eventually be forced to consider alternative solutions such as 
paramilitary operations. Operations properly thought out, and properly executed, with 
respect to the above criteria can play an important role in terms of furthering our national 
objectives. 
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